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Preface 
 
 
 In full disclosure, this thesis is not intended to be a dogmatic or pedantic endorsement of 
any one religion, ethic, or culture.  To the contrary, it is my intent to examine a number of 
competing ideas, philosophies, and belief systems in order to extrapolate their geopolitical 
implications and to pursue them to their logical (albeit sometimes inevitable) conclusions.  Too 
often, any number of presuppositions at work within a given situation go overlooked and 
subsequently skew geopolitical analysis and resulting policy decisions.  This thesis seeks to 
transcend mere opinion or speculation and achieve instead a framework for pragmatic 
comprehension and understanding.  In short, this thesis seeks to defend the notion that ideas 
matter in geopolitics and that sound analysis must account for the ideas esteemed by both the 
entities being observed (e.g. states, peoples, etc.) and the analyst(s) themselves. 
 That said, I would be remiss in this section if I neglected to acknowledge those who 
helped make this work come to fruition.  My parents, who sacrificed constantly to educate me at 
home and set me upon the proverbial “straight and narrow” from the beginning.  My wife, who 
“held down the fort” during extensive research periods and provided fresh eyes to proofread and 
edit.  My advisor, Dr. Parke, who provided critical perspective and encouragement during this 
entire endeavor.  My brothers in arms – Pete, TCN, Winder, Meat, Goat, Tug, Cowboy, and 
Mikey-V –who have mentored me and helped me to become who I am today.  And my selfless 
friends – Ali, Nate, Scout, and Shannon – who gave of their time to read, critique, and ultimately 
make this thesis a reality. 
 
 	  
1 
Introduction 
 
 
At the core of the epistemological question (“How does one know?”) lies an even more 
fundamental question: What is truth?  For without something to know, the methodology of 
epistemological inquiry is little more than a systematic exercise in futility.  Webster’s defines 
truth as “the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality.”1  Yet with such 
a succinct definition, one might expect that the term possesses axiomatic properties and 
delineating it any further would be completely unnecessary, effectively rendering the question 
moot (not to mention eliminating the cliché of beginning a sentence with “Webster’s 
defines…”).  Nonetheless, the question remains: What is truth? 
Philosophers throughout history have wrestled with understanding, interpreting, and 
explaining the metaphysical properties of life.  Plato postulated a cave in which people are 
imprisoned and subjected to living vicariously by interacting with “shadows” as proxies for the 
objects that cast them. 2  However Plato was only one of many Greeks who questioned and 
sought to comprehend the deeper essence and meanings of things.  As wealth and intellectual 
yearnings flourished throughout the Aegean (especially Athens), there was also the 
popularization of an Ionian speculation about the physical world – a speculation that influenced 
Protagoras work and his assertion that “Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are 
that they are and of the things that are not that they are not.”3  Similarly, Pyrrho of Elis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “truth,” accessed November 01, 2015, http://www 
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truth. 
 
 2. Plato, The Republic (Book VII), trans. Benjamin Jowett, accessed November 6, 2015, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.8.vii.html. 
 
 3. C.C.W. Taylor and Mi-Kyoung Lee, “The Sophists,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Fall 2015 ed., accessed November 8, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists. 
 	  
2 
contended that those who desire to be wise must suspend judgment and abstain from the 
controversial position that knowledge could exist with absolute certainty while remaining 
empirically neutral and analyzing things as they appear.4  It is this restless intellectual curiosity 
that stands as the hallmark of Pyrrhonian skepticism, for while others cease inquiring (either due 
to an internal conviction that they possess definitive answers or succumbing to an 
epistemological hopelessness that they are asking unanswerable questions), “the skeptic alone 
remains engaged with the world and open to the possibility of truth – though he no longer stakes 
his happiness on its attainment.”5 
Thus, through these men and many of their Ancient Grecian contemporaries (e.g. 
Socrates, Aristotle, etc.), Philosophy was born.  Through the use of reason, philosophers not only 
devised theories regarding the metaphysical essence of the universe but subsequently built upon 
said theories in order to resolve other issues pertaining to everyday life, such as the question of 
origin (Ontology), the question of morality and value (Axiology), and the question of the best 
institutions and methodologies for governance (Political Philosophy).  Yet what sometimes goes 
without notice is the interplay of how the answer to each of these aforementioned questions has a 
causal and/or correlational relationship with the answers to the others.  When the answers to 
these questions are systematically organized, the resulting “worldviews” are manifestations of 
philosophical thought as they attempt to answer life’s most important questions.  Thus, any 
attempt to understand human behavior, geopolitics and international relations theory included, 
must consider worldview (see Figure 1). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Pyrrhonism,” accessed November 8, 2015, http://www 
.britannica.com/topic/Pyrrhonism. 
 
 5. Jessica Berry, “Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,” (National Endowment 
for the Humanities grant proposal, Georgia State University), 2, accessed November 8, 2015, 
http://www.neh.gov/files/grants/philosophy_nietzsche_and_the_ancient_skeptical_tradition.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Worldview Implications6 
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 6. Derived from “Worldview Chart,” Summit Ministries, 2008, accessed May 28, 2016, 
http://www.summit.org/resources/worldview-chart, and supplemented with research and analysis 
stemming from the entirety of this thesis. Reproduced with permission. 
 	  
4 
 However, it is paramount that during the analytical quest of acquiring understanding the 
analyst must suspend judgment with regards to veracity.  As seen in Figure 1, the mutually 
exclusive nature of different worldviews necessitate the acquiescence to the reality that they 
cannot be simultaneously true despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of people adamantly 
align themselves within one of the aforementioned (or other worldviews not listed).  Therefore, it 
is the request of the Masters Candidate that the reader attempt to understand mankind’s behavior 
through a framework reminiscent of Cicero and the Academic Skeptics (i.e. man “is limited to 
opinions of that which is more or less probable” and consequently embracing philosophy as a 
way of life is superior to endorsing any one school of thought).7  Put another way, man is best 
understood as described by Thomas Aquinas: 
There is a threefold order to be found in man.  The first is that which derives from the 
rule of reason: in so far as all our actions and experiences should be commensurate with 
the guidance of reason.  The second arises from comparison with the rule of divine law, 
which should be our guide in all things.  And if man were actually a solitary animal, this 
double order would suffice: but because man is naturally a social and political animal, as 
is proved [by Aristotle] in I. Politics, chap. 2, it is necessary that there should be a third 
order, regulating the conduct of man to his fellows with whom he has to live.8 
 
For it is this threefold order that accounts for the three distinct entities – the individual, the 
Church, and the State – that have fluctuated between harmony and dissonance for centuries as 
peoples with differing philosophical foundations attempt to establish functioning societies. 
 In short, it is the intent of the Master’s Candidate to demonstrate that people rather than 
nation states are the fundamental actor within international relations – effectively challenging the 
notion that the Treaty of Westphalia and the resulting nation-state system represent the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7. James E. Holton, “Marcus Tullius Cicero,” in History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., 
ed. Leo Strauss and Josephy Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 156. 
 
 8. Thomas Aquinas, “Summae Theologica,” in Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, ed. 
A. P. D’entreves, trans. J. G. Dawson (New York: Barns & Noble, 1959), 109. 
 	  
5 
universalization of certain geopolitical principles.  Consequently, instances of heightened 
tensions and outright conflicts are often multifaceted and rarely find their beginning, 
sustainment, or termination in a singular issue.  Any geopolitical inquiry that attempts to reduce 
wars and rivalries to a single cause (and its corresponding antithesis) run the risk of 
oversimplifying the situation and subsequently generating superficial or incomplete analysis.  
Furthermore, it is also the intent of the Master’s Candidate to demonstrate that sound geopolitical 
analysis must balance two competing analytical aides – the law of parsimony more commonly 
referred to as Occam’s Razor (preferring the simplest of two or more competing theories; 
“plurality should not be posited without necessity”9) and the concept of Irreducible 
Complexity.10  In order to do so, this thesis will first establish constructivism as a sound 
interpretative paradigm within the practice of international relations (Part 1); second, employ 
said paradigm to examine the development of the modern “Western World” by reflecting upon 
the development and evolution of the United States of America (Part 2); third, employ the same 
paradigm to examine the modern Middle East by utilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, and 
transnational terrorism as “case studies” (Part 3); and finally, seek to reconcile the overarching 
findings of Part 2 and Part 3 in order to extrapolate the implications for policy and strategy 
development while also validating the effectiveness of constructivism (Part 4).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Occam’s Razor,” accessed January 31, 2016, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Occams-razor.  
 
 10. Michael J. Behe, “Irreducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution,” Lehigh 
University, last modified October 28, 2015, accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.lehigh.edu 
/bio/Faculty/Behe/PDF/Behe_chapter.pdf, 2. Originally coined as a counterargument to 
Darwinian Evolution, the conceptual framework is no less applicable to the field of geopolitics. 
Behe defines an irreducibly complex system as: “a single system which is necessarily composed 
of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, and where the 
removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning.” 
 	  
6 
Part 1 
A Constructivist Paradigm 
 
In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not 
ideological, political, or economic.  They are cultural.  Peoples and nations are attempting 
to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we?  And they are 
answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by 
reference to the things that mean most to them. 
 
–Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
 
 Modern nation-states are not “indigenous” actors in geopolitics but rather find their origin 
in the conclusion of the Thirty Years War.  As the war endured, the rulers and their armies were 
left with three options: total annihilation of those who opposed them, assimilation of those who 
believed differently (especially with regards to the religious component of the conflict), or devise 
a methodology for peaceful coexistence.  Considering that decades of war claimed millions of 
lives, ravaged the continent, and burdened the economies of all involved – sheer exhaustion 
eventually identified that the first two options were untenable and that the powers at be should 
agree to cease and desist a forcible imposition of faith and/or other interests upon one another.11  
It was this realization that reshaped the political and religious map of Europe and set the stage 
for the centralized Roman Catholic empire to succumb to a community of sovereign states.12 
 Deriving its name from the northwestern portion of Germany, the Peace of Westphalia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11. P. C. “What Happened in the Thirty Years War?,” The Economist, January 17, 2016, 
accessed January 23, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/01 
/economist-explains-5. 
 
 12. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Reader’s Companion to Military 
History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), accessed February 9, 2016, http://www.history.com 
/topics/thirty-years-war. 
 	  
7 
stemmed from a series of treaties and is credited with establishing the modern nation-state 
system.  More specifically, many scholars regard the Westphalian model as the codification of 
“sovereignty” as a two-fold organization of political life based on the principles of “territoriality 
and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures.” 13  As demonstrated in 
the Treaty of Westphalia’s opening article, the ultimate desire was “that thus on all sides they 
may see this Peace and Friendship in the Roman Empire, and the Kingdom of France flourish, by 
entertaining a good and faithful Neighbourhood.”14  This “good and faithful Neighbourhood” 
endeavored to stabilize and sustain a mutually beneficial environment for all, independent of 
ethnicity, creed, or political affinities, as described in Article 64: 
To prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick State, all and every one 
of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd 
in their antient Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial 
Right, as well Ecclesiastick, as Politick Lordships, Regales, by virtue of this present 
Transaction: that they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever 
upon any manner of pretence. 
 
Yet it is important to maintain the distinction that this was not a religious peace.  Key word 
choices and clauses throughout the documents constitute “without any doubt a complete triumph 
of secular politics, which for the first time in centuries had broken away explicitly from 
ecclesiastical guardianship” (i.e. the Church and State became two independent realms, 
coexisting on two parallel paths never to intersect).15  It was this unique component that formed 
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the bedrock of the Westphalian order.  For by secularizing international politics through the 
divorcing of any religious footing (anchoring instead on national interest and reasons of state), 
the doctrine of sovereignty (i.e. no higher authority than the state except that to which the state 
voluntarily yields itself) was promoted and it led to the acceptance of an international society 
based on the inherent legal equality of its members.16 
 However, this also serves to demonstrate that the modern state is an umbrella term 
sheltering multiple social dynamics – religion, as it determined politics up until this time on the 
basis that communities were apprehensive to tolerate any form of belief displeasing to God or 
counterproductive towards salvation; governmental, as kingdoms possessed the tendency to 
fragment in some ways but become unified in others (i.e. absolutism, or the centralization of 
monarchical power, buttressed the concept of sovereignty thereby quelling certain conflicts while 
simultaneously propagating the precarious balance between rule of law and the dictatorial 
ambitions of tyrants which is nothing short of the precursor to civil war); ideological, as the 
philosophical works of individuals such as Hobbes and Locke competed in the marketplace of 
ideas while rulers employed censorship and control of the press to control, in some degree, the 
availability of ideas to both their subjects and the emerging political class vying for personal gain 
in the fledgling bureaucratic environment; and social pragmatism, as “the heterogeneity of an 
individualistic society, combined with the problem of keeping order in a large state by abstract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
shall be oblig'd to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any one, without 
distinction of Religion; and if it happens any point shall be violated, the Offended shall before all 
things exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly 
Composition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.” 
 
 16. Michael Vaughan, “After Westphalia, Whither the Nation State, its People and its 
Governmental Institutions?” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Asia-
Pacific Regional Conference, Brisbane, Australia, September 29, 2011), 5-6, accessed February 
13, 2016, https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:266787/AfterWestphalia.pdf. 
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laws, generated ‘the new politics’ [of the modern state].”17  More succinctly, the Thirty Years 
War’s amalgamated beginning also explains the diverse states that sprung from its end. 
The war was a product of problems which arose from patterns of conflict and the nature 
of the leaders who controlled the governments of the time.  It grew out of a number of 
deep-seated and well established domestic and international conflicts which were old by 
1618 . . . . These conflicts represented differences between the recognized loci of power 
in Europe, and the national and international realities which would have placed that 
power elsewhere.18 
 
The key takeaway from this is simple yet critical to any examination of geopolitics: “The 
territorial state has not always existed in the past, so it need not necessarily exist in the future.”19 
Liberalism versus Realism: The Birth of International Relations Theory 
 In the same way that the nation-state system was socially constructed during a specific set 
of circumstances, so to was the formal study of international relations.  By the end of WWI, the 
European continent was in shambles.  With the desolation perpetuated by its infamous trench 
warfare, the first of the World Wars claimed at least nine million lives and excised considerable 
strain on the political and economic capital of the nations and empires involved.20  In the war’s 
aftermath, as the victorious prepared to usher in the post-war political paradigm, they took time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17. Kenneth Minogue, Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 34-41. 
 
 18. Myron P. Gutmann, “The Origins of the Thirty Years’ War,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 750, accessed February 2, 2016, http://www 
.jstor.org/stable/204823. 
 
 19. Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and 
History, 7th ed. (New York: Longman, 2009), 257. 
 
 20. Jasper Copping, “WW1 Dead and Shell Shock Figures ‘Significantly 
Underestimated,’” The Telegraph, January 16, 2014, accessed February 20, 2016, http://www 
.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10577200/WW1-dead-and-shell-shock-figures 
-significantly-underestimated.html. No precise death toll for WWI has ever formally been 
established, other sources attribute more than 15 million deaths to the conflict (see Nye, 
Understanding International Conflicts, 71). 
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to reflect on what they believed to be the root causes of WWI.  Consolidating their analysis to 
one overarching finding, they ultimately concluded that the war could be attributed to the 
“balance of power.”  At the forefront of this cause was President Woodrow Wilson, a 
progressive who was thoroughly convinced that the balance of power concept “was an evil 
principle because it encouraged statesmen to treat nations like cheeses to be cut up for political 
convenience regardless of the concerns of their people.”21  Steadfast in his conviction that U.S. 
foreign policy was a tool to be used for the progressive fulfillment of God’s will for the world, 
he embraced the Social Gospel within American Christianity and championed a new community 
of nations that would rest on the foundation of collective security and thereby redeem the Old 
World from the system of alliances that flowed directly from the discredited balance of power 
construct.22  It was this mentality that led to the formation of the League of Nations (a failed 
venture that is regarded as “ahead of its time,” but did serve as the conceptual predecessor of the 
United Nations) and caused World War I to be awarded the moniker of “The War to End all 
Wars” (although this mantra would quickly prove to be a misappropriated delusion of grandeur). 
 During the interwar period, the geopolitical environment experienced considerable 
evolution and became increasingly complex.  The international security underwritten by the 
French and British empires began to wane due to the first visible symptoms of, in the words of 
historian Paul Kennedy, “imperial overstretch;”23 the United States and Japan would continue to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 21. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 60. 
 
 22. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal 
Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1991), 3. 
 
 23. Jeff Janaro, “The Danger of Imperial Overstretch,” Foreign Policy Journal, July 15, 
2014, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger 
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grow and expand their respective levels of influence upon the world stage; and Russia would 
become the Soviet Union and so too increase its influence and power.  Given this dynamic and 
ever-changing environment, “the War to End all Wars” and the new liberal order proved of 
questionable legitimacy in its quest to preemptively diffuse conflict, causing some to consider 
alternative analytical frameworks.  Thus, through foundational texts such as E. H. Carr’s The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis (published in 1939, prior to the outbreak of WWII) and Hans Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations (published in 1948), the formal study of international relations emerged 
as a theoretical discipline – Carr and Morgenthau’s “realism” countering the liberal “belief that 
the struggle for power could be tamed by international law and the idea that the pursuit of self-
interest could be replaced by the shared objective of promoting security for all.”24  Ironically, 
just as the liberal viewpoint contended that the balance of power was to be blamed for the onset 
of WWI, the realist perspective maintained that the liberal internationalist ideas were largely 
responsible for the crisis during the interwar years.25 
 Considering that these two schools of thought are mutually exclusive in terms of their 
respective abilities to provide an accurate and comprehensive interpretative framework, the 
emergence of liberalism and realism as the initial components of international relations theory 
beg the question: Which is correct?  Answering the question with a question, it depends on how 
one conceptually answers the question “What is truth?” – the same question with which this 
treatise began.  For how one conceptually understands and defines truth (or attributes the status 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
domestic resources, decline, and fall.” 
 
 24. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, “Introduction,” in Theories of International 
Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1, accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://gondayumitro.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2014/09/Theories-of-IR.pdf. 
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of being “true”) will directly correlate and influence the way in which the state of being correct 
or incorrect is ascribed.  Maintaining the argument philosophical ideas have tangible effects in 
the geopolitical arena, it is the belief of the Master’s Candidate that any attempt to answer the 
question “Which is correct?” dictates the two be evaluated philosophically and pragmatically. 
Defining Liberalism 
 At the core of liberalism lay the “belief that the struggle for power could be tamed by 
international law and the idea that the pursuit of self-interest could be replaced by the shared 
objective of promoting security for all.”26  It places a heavy emphasis on international 
organizations while also appealing to the collective spirit of the human race.  The theory can be 
reduced to three assumptions.  First, the nature of the actors implies that “globalization generates 
differentiated demands from societal individuals and groups with regard to international affairs” 
(i.e. globalization provides an incentive for societies to participate in world politics and leverage 
their differing interests in the geopolitical marketplace, thus advancing the community of nations 
towards mutually beneficial outcomes).27  Second, the nature of the state implies that “states 
represent the demands of a subset of domestic individuals and social groups, on the basis of 
whose interests they define ‘state preferences’ and act instrumentally to manage globalization” 
(i.e. states wield foreign policy, which may or may not be derived from the interests of their 
constituents, to interact with one another and the differing desired end states will encourage 
compromise and stability).28  Third, the nature of the international system implies that “the 
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pattern of interdependence among state preferences shapes state behavior” (i.e. the “transaction 
costs” that naturally occur upon one another as states pursue their respective preferences cause 
the international system to work towards equilibrium, but international organizations can be 
utilized as mediators when given preferences are not compatible).29  Put another way, liberalism 
can be described as the understanding that peace is secured through the propagation of 
democratic institutions around the world (because people do not cause wars but rather 
governments do), a concept underpinned by the belief in the so-called “natural harmony of 
interests” (point two above) and defended by collective security and resolving disputes through 
judicial processes since the rule of law is equally as applicable to states as it is individuals.30 
Philosophical Evaluation of Liberalism 
 Many regard John Locke as the foundation of liberalism.  His works “offered far deeper 
critiques of divine right absolutism, reconceiving the moral purpose of the state, promoting the 
sovereignty of the ‘people,’ and advocating a legislative conception of procedural justice.”31  As 
he writes in his acclaimed Two Treatises of Government: “MEN being . . . by nature, all free, 
equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power 
of another, without his own consent.”32  He also describes men coming together to form “one 
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community” and “one body politic.”33  But liberalism is sustained by far more than Locke.  It 
shares commonality with the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, particularly 
Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle (“not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest 
amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is 
always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, 
and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it”34) and Rene Descartes’s morale par 
provision (“the law that requires us to do all we can for the general welfare of mankind” and 
“each of us is bound to do what he can to procure the good of others, and someone who doesn’t 
help anyone else is strictly worthless”35).  In this same vein are also Sir Thomas Moore’s Utopia 
(“Nature inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much raised above the rest of 
mankind as to be the only favourite of nature”36) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s On The Social 
Contract (“Each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no 
associate over which he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains 
an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he 
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has”37).  If surmised no other way, the philosophical roots of liberalism consist of Renaissance 
Humanism (i.e. the perfectibility of man through virtue and character, in and of itself an 
extension of the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenism) and an attempt to systematically 
actualize Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative: “Act only on a maxim by which you can will 
that it, at the same time, should become a general law.”38 
Pragmatic Evaluation of Liberalism 
 The efficacy of liberalism has been and continues to be convoluted and inconsistent at 
best.  The Wilsonian model that cleaved to “the war to end all wars,” allowed another global 
conflict just two decades later.  “The League of Nations embodied a paradox: it spoke the 
language of the brotherhood of man but existed as the result of a military victory.  Like the older 
Concert of Europe, which it defined itself against, it was the instrument of a triumphant alliance 
of Great Powers and a means to preserve their domination of Europe – and their values – into the 
peace.”39  Moreover, as the liberal order encouraged national self-determination for the new 
standard of international politics, unbeknownst to its proponents doing so would prove “to open 
a Pandora’s box of competing claims and turn minorities into a political problem.”40 
 This is not to say that liberalism has no redeeming traits.  To the contrary, despite the 
failures of the interbellum period (particularly the League of Nations), liberal theorists responded 
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to events and shifted its substantive focus of investigation to address changing realities after 
WWII and ignited an even broader effort for the construction of international organizations – 
resulting in the solidification of international law and the development of the United Nations, the 
World Bank (originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and the 
International Monetary Fund.41  Additionally, the post-WWII 
Emergence of European integration was especially momentous.  On the Continent, where 
the state system had developed and which had been witness to centuries of great-power 
rivalry and war, states were combining aspects of governance in some new creation.  The 
project of European unification has undergone fits and starts over the past half-century, 
but the very project itself implies some transcendence of the anarchic state of nature in 
which realists presume states find themselves.42 
 
But the key point is “European integration” (which in this context arguably includes the U.S.). 
 As Francis Fukuyama conveys in “The End of History?”: “What we may be witnessing is 
not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”43  Buried 
within this neo-Kantian position, as one commentator writes, is the assumption “that particular 
states, with liberal-democratic credentials, constitute an ideal which the rest of the world will 
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emulate.”44  Liberalism found a sustaining lacteal vein in the Western World, seemingly 
validating the paradigm and becoming codified in thoughts such as Democratic Peace Theory.  
Yet liberalism has struggled to successfully bridge the divide between the West and non-Western 
states in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.  The rise in transnational terrorism and Islamic 
militancy has also proven to be an “influential revolt against Western cultural authority.”45  
Simply put, as one critic contends, “History isn’t over and neither liberalism nor democracy is 
ascendant.  The comfy Western consensus [Fukuyama] inspired is under threat in ways he never 
predicted” (ex. a resurgent Russia, China’s “Marxist capitalism,” the Islamic State, etc.).46 
Defining Realism 
 Any definition of realism would be remiss without returning to the source – E. H. Carr 
and Hans Morgenthau.  If reduced to a single point, realism revolves around the concept of 
power.  Contending that the liberal “assumption of the elimination of power from politics could 
only result from a wholly uncritical attitude towards political problems,” Carr argues that power 
is international relations’ central tenant and can be classified in “theoretically separable” but 
“closely interdependent” categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.47  
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Similarly, Morgenthau argued that 
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.  Whatever the ultimate 
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.  Statesmen and peoples 
may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself.  They may define their 
goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal.  They may hope that 
this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or 
through the natural development of human affairs.  They may also try to further its 
realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations 
or international organizations.  But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of 
international politics, they do so by striving for power.48 
 
In short, realism contends that combining anarchy (i.e. the natural state resulting from no 
international government), egoism (i.e. people, whether on their own or in groups, inclined to 
pursue their own self-interest), and groupism (i.e. politics occurs between and within groups) 
leads to “strong pressures to conflict-generating power politics.”49  Such a position has theorists 
prioritize their weight of effort towards the groups that people identify themselves with (e.g. 
tribes, empires, nations, etc.), acknowledging the major influence they exert on human affairs 
and believing that it is analytically advantageous to focus on the most powerful.50 
Philosophical Evaluation of Realism 
 Considering that realism emerged as the antithesis of liberalism, one may errantly 
conclude that the philosophical foundation of realism must be antithetical to that of liberalism.  
This is not the case.  Realists do not inherently reject the legitimacy of liberal ideas such as 	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human rights, self-determination of peoples, or the rule of law, just as they do not inherently 
reject the philosophical work of Locke, Kant, or Descartes.  Instead, they reject the notion of the 
perfectibility of man through the universal appeal of liberal ideals and instead assume that human 
nature demonstrates that this is not feasible or realistic.  Referring to the “utopian” stage of 
political science (i.e. the post-WWI liberal order), Carr asserts  
The investigators will pay little attention to existing “facts” or to the analysis of cause 
and effect, but will devote themselves whole-heartedly to the elaboration of visionary 
projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view – projects whose 
simplicity and perfection give them an easy and universal appeal.  It is only when these 
projects break down, and wish or purpose is shewn to be incapable by itself of achieving 
the desired end, that the investigators will reluctantly call in the aid of analysis.51 
 
Although Carr goes on to say that “Machiavelli is the first important political realist,”52 this 
perspective distorts the actual age of realism.  “Political realism, Realpolitik, ‘power politics,’ is 
the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international relations.”53  It is at the core of the 
ancient Sanskrit proverb that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.”54  More distinctly, the 
Athenian delegation (“Melian Dialogue”) in Thucydides’s The History of the Peloponnesian War 
arguably presents “the most radical, and probably best-known, realist rejection of ethics [or 
transcendent liberal norms] in international affairs.”55  The Melians, as it implored the Athenians 
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to spare their lands, boldly stated that “right, as the world goes, is only in question between 
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” 56  
Carr’s historicity notwithstanding, Machiavelli’s influence on realism cannot be 
disregarded.  Machiavellianism lowers morality and makes it subservient (domestically and 
internationally) to power on the basis that “morality is nothing but fear-inspired 
peaceableness.”57  The natural result, in Machiavelli’s own words, is the perspective that “Men 
ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, 
of more serious ones they cannot.”58  In fact, Carr & Morgenthau’s reaction to liberalism is not 
all that different from Machiavelli’s response to his philosophical peers who had idealistic 
tendencies.  “The classics failed, according to Machiavelli, because they aimed too high.  
Because they based their political doctrines on considerations of man’s highest aspirations, the 
life of virtue and the society dedicated to the promotion of virtue, they rendered themselves 
ineffective; as [Francis] Bacon said, they made ‘imaginary laws for imaginary 
commonwealths.’”59  It was this same thought process that paved the way for Thomas Hobbes’s 
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notions that political schemes accounting for man’s egotistical and megalomaniacal propensities 
possess far greater potential for realization than the utopian aspirations of the classics;60 that the 
consolidation of power best addresses the State of Nature that plagues “the life of man, solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”61 
Pragmatic Evaluation of Realism 
 Realism, in the same manner as liberalism, does not have a flawless record.  The proverb 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has been egregiously consistent in that the “enemy of my 
enemy” was either an enemy in disguise or would become an enemy in the future.62  Similarly, 
“defenders of balance-of-power policies argue that they produce stability.  However, peace and 
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stability are not the same thing”63 (e.g. the Cold War never ignited into total war, but those 
decades were far from stable; China’s unprecedented expansion into the South China Sea in 
conjunction with its military reforms and modernization have not precipitated conflict, but 
stability is not a word used to describe the region; etc.).  It also fails to effectively answer the 
root cause(s) of the apparent validity of Democratic Peace Theory. 
 Nevertheless, realism does possess a level of legitimacy that has proven useful.  For 
instance, returning to the Hobbesian framework, 
Hobbes’s man emerges from his writings as a not-too-far distant relative of modern 
“economic man.”  He is selfish, being concerned with his own welfare, and he is a 
rational-maximizer, being concerned in an uncertain world with achieving the greatest 
possible security.  He is also more or less equal to his fellow men in power and in the 
capacity to secure his own welfare.  From these facts, which Hobbes believed to be self-
evident, a state of conflict between men is deduced: a “condition which is called Warre; 
and such warre, as is of every man, against every man.”64 
 
When this thought process is applied to states as rational actors, it does produce a model that has 
more consistent results.  For example, the Cold War’s “Mutually Assured Destruction” provided 
a better deterrence than did the League of Nations and its collective security.  In the same way, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has better addressed problems, when the use of force was 
deemed necessary, than many United Nations Peacekeeping Operations or actions conducted by 
the United Nations Security Council.  More recently, the regional alliances beginning in the 
South China Sea (e.g. Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, etc.) are seemingly providing better 
deterrence than the liberal “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”65  Yet 
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even with its success, as noted above the rise in transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy has 
not only proven to be an influential revolt against Western cultural authority (i.e. contra-
liberalism), but the effervescent threat of terrorism against the United States (e.g. USS Cole, 
9/11, etc.), England (ex. London Bus Bombings), France (ex. 2015 Paris Shootings), and around 
the world, in spite of their superior military power, the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, the more than a 
decade of sustained NATO operations in Afghanistan, and the ongoing coalition against the 
Islamic State, realism struggles to address many of the same issues as liberalism. 
A Third Option? 
 Considering the abundance of other theories within the field of international relations 
(e.g. the English School, Institutionalism, Marxism, Neoconservativism, Neoliberalism, etc.), the 
question posed by the heading of this section may seem shortsighted, or worse – uninformed.  
However, it can be argued that these other schools of thought are essentially extensions of or 
modifications to liberalism or realism as opposed to the emergence of a fundamentally different 
theory.  Others have taken this one step further by arguing 
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the academic study of international relations is 
a debate about realism.  Realism provides a foil against which many other schools of 
thought define themselves and their contributions.  Take realism out of the picture and 
the identities of these other schools as well as the significance of their arguments become 
much less clear.  The study of international politics thus is in an important sense 
inexplicable without a grounding in realism.66 
 
Thus the inquiry towards a so-called “third” option is entirely intentional. 
 At its core is an understanding of the purpose of modeling within international relations.  
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Formal models “search for the nature of the logic of various situations such as conflict situations; 
they try to investigate the consequences of various sorts of assumptions being true; they also try 
to structure theories to make them amenable to empirical test by statistical means, something that 
is difficult unless some minimum degree of formality is allowed.”67  The danger lies when 
models disproportionately allow “formality” to overpower analysis or have incomplete and/or 
imprecise “assumptions being true.”  Albeit in different ways, both realism and liberalism 
concede the existence of the nation-state system as an established reality within international 
relations, without questioning how and why people choose to align themselves accordingly.  
More importantly, although Westphalian sovereignty plays a key role in realism (e.g. balance of 
power, a state’s inherent right to non-interference, etc.) and liberalism (e.g. self-determination of 
people, U.N. membership, etc.), neither accounts for how sovereignty is established or 
recognized without referring to it as an abstract concept (i.e. it simply exists).68  In fact, when 
liberals and realists refer to sovereignty, it is often as if it were two different things.  A realist, for 
example, might regard Westphalian sovereignty as important but not absolute or transcendent: 
Recognized states have been dismembered and even absorbed.  The conquest of any 
particular state extinguishes the sovereignty of that state (domestic, Westphalian, 
interdependence, and usually international legal), but conquest is not a challenge to 
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty as institutional forms.  It reconfigures 
borders but does not create new principles and norms.69 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 67. Michael Nicholson, “Formal Methods in International Relations,” in Evaluating 
Methodology in International Studies, ed. Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher (Ann Arbor, 
MI: The University of Michigan Press), 24. 
 
 68. Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” 
The International History Review 21, no. 3 (September 1999): 570-71, accessed February 13, 
2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109077. Scholarship differs as to whether sovereignty is a 
“historically novel method of organization” that emerged in close proximity to the intellectual 
and cultural changes leading up to Westphalia or a historical fact that Westphalia recognized. 
 
 69. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 20. 
 	  
25 
While a liberal may go so far as to claim “sovereignty has been central to our understanding of 
the states system and is the fundamental principle enunciated in the charter of the United 
Nations” all the while failing to (or choosing not to) realize the inherent contradiction that 
yielding to an international organization sometimes means forgoing one’s sovereignty.70  It is 
these conflicting interpretations of sovereignty that point to constructivism as a “third option.” 
Defining Constructivism 
 Constructivism is a subjective relativism.  This is not to say that truth is relative, for as 
discussed previously truth exists independent of perception.  Nevertheless what people perceive 
to be true, regardless of its veracity, does impact the way they behave.  As noted in the field of 
psychology: “Human cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets of beliefs and 
assumptions about life and reality.”71  Considering that autocratic regimes, nomadic tribes, 
nation states, and transnational organizations are all comprised of people that to some extent 
share any number of baseline commonalities in said “sets of beliefs and assumptions about life 
and reality,” it is only logical for geopolitical analysis to interpret the behavior of international 
actors within the context of the ideas they espouse.  Thus constructivists 
emphasize the importance of ideas and culture in shaping both the reality and the 
discourse of international politics.  They stress the ultimate subjectivity of interests and 
their links to changing identities. . . . They believe that leaders and other people are 
motivated not only by material interests, but also by their sense of identity, morality, and 
what a society or culture considers appropriate.  And such norms change over time.72 
 
Constructivism presents a distinct contrast to both the materialistic foundations of realism (e.g. 
power, vying for resources, etc.) and the transcendent rationalism to the liberal strains of thought 	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(e.g. the perfectibility of man, the supremacy of the West, etc.).73  Rather than limit itself to 
theoretical, macro-level analysis and anthropomorphize institutions and structures, 
constructivism instead concedes a “constitutive relationship between agents [i.e. people] and 
structures,” thereby facilitating a framework for the study of international relations that rests on 
empirical analysis as opposed to analysis that only goes as far as the meta-theoretical level.74 
 Yet, because constructivism is one of the newest interpretative paradigms within the 
study of international relations its scope and meaning still possess elements of fluidity (e.g. so-
called Marxian constructivisms; modernist and postmodernist constructivisms; postcolonial 
constructivisms, etc.) 75  Thus, it is critical that the usage of the constructivist paradigm for the 
remainder of this thesis be defined and framed by identifying the fundamental assumptions: 
v The ideas, beliefs, and convictions of people are the critical component to understanding 
international relations.  Although the prevailing ideas, beliefs, and convictions within a 
given society are continually changing and evolving, they are the fundamental building 
block of identities (e.g. tribal, national, supranational, etc.). 
v Accepting Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with governmental action 
to formulate public policy,76 it necessarily follows that understanding the origin of ideas 
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(i.e. worldview) is key to understanding a government’s policy (foreign and domestic). 
v International organizations, political institutions, and domestic structures are not sentient 
and thus do not possess a will of their own.  Analyzing organizations, institutions, and/or 
structures without examining the prevailing ideas (and antitheses, particularly in times of 
unrest) of the people that comprise them will inevitably be superficial and/or incomplete. 
v In the end, constructivism examines international politics by reflecting upon who people 
believe themselves to be as opposed to superimposing the assumptions of a theoretical 
framework (e.g. realism, liberalism, etc.) upon them and struggling to reconcile 
deviations from said theory post facto. 
Philosophical Evaluation of Constructivism 
 Constructivism is philosophically agnostic.  This may seem counterintuitive to argue that 
the theory of international relations revolving around ideas is somehow indifferent towards the 
corporate enterprise of ideas (i.e. philosophy) – nothing could be further from the truth.  As 
demonstrated in the section on liberalism and realism, these two theories have a philosophical 
foundation contributing to the assumptions of the theories themselves.  Constructivism instead 
identifies the philosophical ideas of the actors involved and prudently allows them to play out. 
 This is not to say that philosophers do not speak of the interplay between ideas and 
behavior, therefore attesting to the validity of constructivism’s premise.  Aquinas took notice: 
“But since man’s reason must be concerned not only with what is useful to man, but also with 
men themselves, in that it governs their, actions, it proceeds in both these cases from the simple 
to the complex.”77  Francis Bacon explained what can be considered one of the earliest 
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expressions of constructivism: 
For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is received law, 
and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is 
another.  For there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are 
derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils 
through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments 
where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.78 
 
John Stuart Mill made similar observations: 
The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the 
last results of metaphysical analysis, practiced on the elementary notions with which the 
science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an 
edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be 
never dug down to and exposed of light.  But though in science the particular truths 
precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical 
art, such as morals or legislation.  All actions is for the sake of some end, and rules of 
action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the 
end to which they are subservient.79 
 
In short, correlating ideas, behavior, and governmental actions is not unique to constructivism. 
 But in the spirit of consistency with the previous sections, if there is any philosopher for 
constructivism it is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  He conceptually separated the state and 
civil society, noting the intrinsic conflict in the transition from the family to the state; “the kind 
of ethical life found in the human micro-community in order to be itself contradicted and 
overcome by the macro-community of the politically independent, sovereign nation.”80  For this 
reason, Hegel channels considerable attention towards the notion of the “real state” (i.e. the 	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amalgamated views of the constituents, leaders, institutions, etc. – how the collective state as a 
multifaceted entity views itself and makes decisions).  Consequently, Hegel’s political 
philosophy hinges its weight of effort towards understanding the role of history and dialectic.81  
With regards to history, he speaks to the power of how a person or collective of people 
understand their past (to include when leaders, dictators, etc. strategically leverage revisionist 
history, censorship, and propaganda to facilitate public support for their desired objectives). 
A history that aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, must indeed 
forego the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually existed.  It 
must foreshorten its pictures by abstractions; and this involves not merely the omission of 
events and deeds, but whatever is implied in the fact that Thought is, after all, the most 
trenchant epitomist.  A battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains its original 
proportions, but is put off with a bare mention.82 
 
But his use of history is best understood as an offshoot of his dialectic, his belief that speculative 
knowledge consists “of the unity of opposites, or of the positive in the negative,”83 and that 
“reason is spirit” which results in each singular perception or observation processed by an 
individual (“ego”) become part of the individual and is possessed “in its universal truth – it is 
self-contained essential reality.  This character, still abstract, which constitutes the nature of 
absolute fact, of ‘fact itself,’ is to begin with ‘spiritual reality.’”84  He writes: 
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The rational is actual; and the actual is rational.  Upon this conviction rests all naïve 
consciousness, as does philosophy, and philosophy starts from it in considering the 
spiritual universe as well as the natural one.  If reflections, sentiment or whatever form 
subjective consciousness may have, looks upon the present as something vain, transcends 
it and knows it better, such subjective consciousness is itself vanity, since it has reality 
only in the present.  If correspondingly the idea is seen as merely just an idea, an 
opinionated notion, philosophy by contrast offers the insight that nothing is actual but the 
idea.85 
 
Thus, in the Hegelian paradigm, ideas and perceptions are the driving force behind human 
interactions.  Translating this into the political arena, “Hegel must defend the rationality of the 
real state against the romantics who turn away from politics simply, but equally against the 
utopians and reformers who turn away from the real state in favor of an ideal state”86 
Pragmatic Evaluation of Constructivism 
 The majority of the pragmatic evaluation of constructivism will occur in the remaining 
chapters.  That said there are a few theoretical evaluations that are appropriate to address prior to 
closing the current chapter.  First, constructivism attests to the convoluted situation(s) leading up 
to the Thirty Years War and its resolution through Westphalia.  Although the various parties 
fought for differing reasons, as exhaustion set in they resolved to end the conflict but enjoy a 
peace that enabled their respective beliefs, identities, and interests to coexist in geographic 
proximity – the nation-state system (“The fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that 
states exist in specific territories, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters 
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of legitimate behavior”87). 
 Second, it also explains the emergence of international relations theory – competing ideas 
and beliefs pitting themselves against one another.  Yet, in Hegelian fashion, constructivism 
effectively reconciles the opposites contained within the overarching points and accuracies of 
liberalism and realism.  For instance, Fukuyama’s argument that history in the philosophical 
sense deviated from the expectations of the political left (ex. economic and political 
modernization did not lead to communism as the Marxists and Soviet Union had avowed) and 
instead culminated in “liberty elected governments, individual rights, an economic system in 
which capital and labor circulated with relatively modest state oversight.88  The apparent veracity 
of liberalism’s Democratic Peace Theory and the continued partnerships between the United 
States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia reinforce this position – but the alternative 
interpretation within the constructivist paradigm would argue that the socially constructed 
similarities form a symbiotic foundation for interoperability and have nothing to do with 
democracy but rather the shared values that led to the adoption of democracy within those 
nations in the first place.  Likewise, the realists argue that the balance of power employed 
through NATO and the concepts of “Mutually Assured Destruction” that were critical to 	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preventing the Cold War from becoming total war serve as a validation of realism – yet the 
constructivist counter would posit that short-term “friends of necessity” are based on the 
commonly held national interest of survival but offer little continuity to adequately explain 
change over long periods of time in world politics (e.g. former Warsaw Pact countries that are 
now partnered with the West, Vietnam’s attempts to partner with the United States in the wake 
of Chinese encroachment within the South China Sea, etc.).89 
 Finally, and most importantly, constructivism bridges the void where liberalism and 
realism fail to effectively interpret and explain certain geopolitical events.  For example, realism 
does not comprehensively account for the reality that “500 British nuclear weapons are less 
threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are 
friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of 
shared understandings.”90  Similarly, neither liberalism or realism answer the question of Islamic 
terrorism and its willingness to take on the strongest nations, even to the point that death is 
welcomed with open arms through the application of martyrdom.  Yet the constructivist 
paradigm begins to account for these deficiencies as it takes into account the fact that “national 
interests and values . . . may also constrain a state’s foreign policy”91 and that “societal demands 
are a variable, shifting with factors such as technology, geography, and culture. . . . In nearly all 
social situations, shifts in control over material resources, authoritative values, and opportunities 
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for social control have domestic and transnational distributional implications.”92 
The Way Ahead 
 Ideas matter.  As demonstrated thus far, ideas have ramifications as they are acted upon 
and can effect individuals, groups, nations, and beyond.  Thus, it is the conviction of the 
Master’s Candidate that an analytical model for international relations must not superimpose a 
mass of presuppositions upon the actors it seeks to understand but should instead seek to 
understand the presuppositions of the actors and allow them to explain why it is they do what 
they do.  In the words of Samuel Huntington,  
In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not 
ideological, political, or economic.  They are cultural.  Peoples and nations are attempting 
to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we?  And they are 
answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by 
reference to the things that mean most to them.93 
 
It is ideas, convictions, and beliefs (i.e. what people perceive as true), that cause tribes, nations, 
alliances, etc., to act or not act in a given situation because these entities are nothing less than 
collectives of people.  Tribes, nations, and alliances are not sentient – they are comprised of 
people and analysis must be wary of attributing overgeneralized corporate essence to them 
without understanding their fundamental element – people.  Therefore, accepting the 
psychological observation that “human cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets 
of beliefs and assumptions about life and reality” and the political observation contained within 
Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with governmental action to formulate public 
policy and it becomes increasingly difficult to refute that understanding people as individuals 
and how they align themselves in groups is critical to understanding international relations.  	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Part 2 
Deconstructing the West 
 
While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners which are now 
producing desolation in so many parts of the world; while she continues sincere, and 
incapable of insidious and impious policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in 
the local destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of America once 
become capable of that deep simulation towards one another, and towards foreign 
nations, which assumes the language of justice and moderation while it is practising 
iniquity and extravagance, and displays in the most captivating manner the charming 
pictures of candor, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and insolence, this 
country will be the most miserable habitation in the world; because we have no 
government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by 
morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest 
cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only 
for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other. 
 
–John Adams, “To the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of 
Massachusetts, October 11, 1798” 
 
 
 There is an imprecise (and worse, inaccurate) tendency to conceptualize “the West” as 
monolithic – an unchanging constant that has neither waivered or evolved since the spirit of 
democracy was birthed from the womb of Ancient Greece.  Yet from Athenian Democracy, to 
the Roman Republic, to the Christendom of the Byzantines, to the Westphalian nation states of 
Europe – the West has changed and will continue to change as prevailing identities and ideas 
shift with the ebb and flow of the societies carrying the mantle of “Western.”  In fact, buzz words 
such as “freedom,” “liberty,” and “justice,” along with their respective antitheses (i.e. 
“oppression,” “tyranny,” and “injustice”) have specific meanings and connotations intrinsic to 
the development of the West and do not necessarily translate effectively to non-subscribers of the 
so-called “Western way of life.”  Even as the West evolves and the prevailing worldviews and 
ideas shift, these concepts that form the bedrock of Western civilization are subsequently 
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redefined.  To demonstrate this point, consider the development of the United States. 
The Thirteen Colonies 
The United States, prior to declaring independence in 1776 was a series of European 
colonies scattered along the eastern seaboard.  Although they were founded in different areas, in 
general, they had one unifying force: Christianity.  The “Virginia Charter,” a document granting 
authority from the crown to establish colonies in America, depicts a clear link between the 
Christian faith and the colonization of the New World.  One section reads:  
We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their Desires for the Furtherance 
of so noble a Work, which may, by the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the 
Glory of his Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, as yet 
live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and Worship of God, 
and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages, living in those parts, to human Civility, 
and to a settled and quiet Government: DO, by these our Letters Patents, graciously 
accept of, and agree to, their humble and well-intended Desires.94 
 
This charter, in addition to extending the rights of Englishmen to any new colonies that would be 
established, also committed America to a Christian purpose.95  In similar fashion, the Plymouth 
Colony’s “Mayflower Compact” proudly declared: 
IN THE NAME OF GOD, AMEN.  We, whose names are underwritten, the Loyal 
Subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord King James, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, 
France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c.  Having undertaken for the Glory 
of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and 
Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these 
Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and 
combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick.96 
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As the colonies expanded and thrived, Christianity proved to be a solid foundation for 
growth.  Over one hundred years later, the colonies’ reputation for Christianity remained intact.  
In 1775, on the brink of war with England, “the great statesman Edmund Burke tried to warn the 
British Parliament that the Americans could not be subjugated: ‘the people are Protestants, and 
of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion.’”97  One 
year later, while renouncing their formal political ties to the crown, America found vindication in 
the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” and the belief that all men “are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”98  In short, the Revolutionary War itself was both 
fought under the banner of Christian premises and terminated in a Christian document (“In the 
name of the most holy and undivided Trinity”) that recognized the Westphalian order (“His 
Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free sovereign and independent 
states, that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all 
claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof”).99 
18th Century America 
With its recently acquired independence, the newfound United States was forced to 
determine the way in which it would govern independent of the British crown.  Its initial 
attempts in The Articles of Confederation did not effectively facilitate a stable domestic 
environment.  The second attempt, however, proved more productive – but was not without its 
idiosyncrasies.  Particularly, as noted by John Adams, “Our Constitution was made only for a 	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moral and religious people.  It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”100  For 
without a baseline morality held in common by the general populace, a limited government 
paradigm would prove futile.  At the same time, “recognizing that citizens have passionate and 
irreconcilable religious or ideological differences, the U.S. Constitution devolves decisions about 
these differences to an intermediate level of government-states, provinces, cantons, etc.”101 
Yet America was faced with challenges other than remaining steadfast in its religious 
values.  In the days of its infancy, the United States was forced to contemplate its position and 
role in the international arena.  When the 56 American leaders affixed their signatures to the 
Declaration of Independence, they forfeited the protection of North American trading ventures 
that the British Navy had afforded them, especially against the Barbary Pirates in the 
Mediterranean.  Thus, the Founding Fathers were given the monumental task of determining how 
to protect its own trade – hence a Constitution that authorizes the creation of a standing Navy 
and the punishment of “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”102  But addressing 
the safety of American trade was not as simple as amassing a navy. 
The overarching piracy problem was exacerbated by a longstanding tradition of European 
weakness during which tribute, ransoms, and bribes incentivized piracy and “promoted a growth 
industry of terrorism.”103  America adopted this approach for years and began allocating 	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substantial resources for the purpose of bribing the Barbary States.  However, the shame of 
paying tribute and the pragmatic failure of these investments to attain peace or safe passage for 
trading vessels in the Mediterranean led many, such as William Eaton, to assert: “There is but 
one language which can be held to these people and this is terror.”104  Such convictions seemed 
all the more justified when juxtaposed with the outcome of the 1786 diplomatic meeting between 
Jefferson, Adams, and Tripolitian ambassador to Britain ‘Abd al-Rahman.  Despite attempts by 
the American delegation to convince the Barbary leader of the United States’ affection for all 
nations, ‘Abd al-Rahman invoked Koranic writings and claimed that any nation’s failure to 
acknowledge Islamic authority is sinful and that it was the Muslims’ right and duty to wage war 
upon whoever they could.105  Yet, despite these jihadi-style threats pushing foreign policy 
decision makers towards the use of force, the blood and treasure that would be required for 
another war weighed heavy on many in post-Revolutionary War America, leading even to 
attempted religious compromise in the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” which sought to 
dissuade the violence propagated by the Barbary States by avowing that the U.S. government “is 
not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion.”106  Although some historians argue that the 
Barbary Wars were “primarily about trade, not theology, and that rather than being holy wars, 
they were an extension of America’s War of Independence,”107 the struggles inflicted by the 
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Barbary Pirates nevertheless forced America in to wrestle with her fundamental identity. 
 Additionally, as the century came to a close, George Washington encouraged his 
successors to utilize caution and discretion with regards to American foreign policy in the days 
ahead.  He urged his country to avoid becoming enslaved to over-involvement with overseas 
operations and foreign treaties that would strain America’s resources and potentially jeopardize 
the country’s ability to survive as a nation.  Bidding his presidency farewell, he exhorted: 
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the 
foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be 
understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim 
no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I 
repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my 
opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.  
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable 
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.108 
  
Despite the abundance of theories regarding Washington’s intent, regardless of whether the first 
president’s sentiments are interpreted as full-fledge isolationism or simply avoiding “entangling 
alliances,” it is an inarguable reality that he understood overseas involvement on any level posed 
a challenge, and a potential risk, to their sovereignty and survivability.  He ultimately desired 
that the U.S. would focus on being Americans and concentrate on doing that which would bring 
about the best results for itself rather than suffer from possible political overstretch. 
19th Century America 
 In 1803, the Louisiana Purchase acquired the Louisiana Territory from France at a price 
of fifteen million dollars, or four cents per acre, effectively doubling America’s size and opening 
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the continent to westward expansion.109  Challenged once again by the British, a victory in the 
War of 1812 “confirmed American nationhood and secured a new respect for the infant republic 
among the powers of Europe.”110  Likewise, after deploying the United States Marine Corps “to 
the shores of Tripoli” and other operations in North Africa, America also secured economic 
power by demonstrating to the Barbary States that she was not to be taken lightly.  Thus, with its 
place in the world affirmed, the American identity took root and continued to grow and evolve. 
 On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe delivered his seventh annual address to 
Congress.  Within this speech, he expressed “doctrinal” concepts that would become embodied 
in American foreign policy for future generations and invigorate a fervent sense of pride and 
nationalism in the American people by communicating to foreign opposition that aggressive 
expansion would not be viewed passively.  He said: 
The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the 
liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic.  In the wars of the 
European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor 
does it comport with our policy to do so.  It is only when our rights are invaded or 
seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.  With the 
movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by 
causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.111 
 
This Monroe Doctrine demanded that Europe respect the Western Hemisphere as the U.S. sphere 
of interest and warned that further colonization or puppet regimes would not be tolerated.112  
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However, if interpreted contextually with the milieu of a young United States, the significance of 
this doctrinal statement is the strong assertion of America as a nation.  By openly defying any 
foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere, Monroe proudly conveyed America’s intentions 
to attain prominence on the world stage and regional supremacy in North America.  Thus, to be 
an American was to be a part of a nation that knew who it was and boldly declared to any 
potential interference that provocation or accosting behavior of any kind would come at a price.  
Even though Monroe’s policy statements were widely ignored outside America, and the fact that 
this policy could not have been sustained militarily in 1823 without British Naval power 
deterring potential aggression in Latin America,113 it was still a blatant expression of America’s 
newfound identity as the rising power in the region. 
 This fervent national spirit served as a driving force for the United States.  Stemming 
from the same line of thought as the Monroe Doctrine, the notion of Manifest Destiny emerged 
during this same period of time.  At its core was a “vision of a great and democratic nation, 
specifically favored by Providence, whose ‘floor shall be a hemisphere.’”114  Thus, when 
President James Polk faced direct and indirect challenges to American sovereignty via European 
involvement in North America, particularly in the Oregon, California, and Texas territories, he 
did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify a military response but rather “reinterpreted the 
Monroe Doctrine in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny.  Whereas Monroe had 
said only that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialism, Polk now 
stated that European nations had better not interfere with projected territorial expansion by the 
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United States.”115  Before a joint session of Congress, Polk asserted 
The rapid extension of our settlements over our territories heretofore unoccupied, the 
addition of new States to our Confederacy, the expansion of free principles, and our 
rising greatness as a nation are attracting the attention of the powers of Europe, and lately 
the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a “balance of power” on this continent 
to check our advancement.  The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations 
of good understanding with all nations, can not in silence permit any European 
interference on the North American continent, and should any such interference be 
attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards.116 
 
He went on to speak of the tumultuous environment in Europe leading up to Westphalia and 
how, even hundreds of years later, that still effected the way in which the sovereigns and nations 
of Europe conducted their affairs at home and abroad. 
The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe.  Jealousy 
among the different sovereigns of Europe, lest any one of them might become too 
powerful for the rest, has caused them anxiously to desire the establishment of what they 
term the “balance of power.”  It cannot be permitted to have any application on the North 
American continent, and especially to the United States.  We must ever maintain the 
principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. 
 
Yet within this sentiment lies a critical distinction between the United States and the European 
powers.  For as religion (among other societal forces) eventually led to the fragmenting of 
Europe through the Peace of Westphalia, the American system of government is entirely 
different from that of Europe because of the unifying nature of American Christianity. 
 Religion was such a fundamental component of the American identity that de Tocqueville 
linked it to “democratic instincts” and the “spirit of individual independence.”117  He writes: 
It must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to Anglo-American society.  In the 	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United States, religion is therefore mingled with all the habits of the nation and all the 
feelings of patriotism, whence it derives a peculiar force.  To this reason another of no 
less power may be added: in America, religion has, as it were, laid down its own limits.  
Religious institutions have remained wholly distinct from political institutions, so that 
former laws have been easily changed whilst former belief has remained unshaken.  
Christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in America; and I 
would more particularly remark, that its sway is not only that of a philosophical doctrine 
which has been adopted upon inquiry, but of a religion which is believed without 
discussion.118 
 
In light of this, it can be argued that faith, whether sacred or the civic derivative, played a 
seminal role in U.S. domestic and foreign policy during this period.  For example, just as the 
First Great Awakening fueled colonial America’s sense of its own “divine election,”119 the 
religious leaders of the Second Great Awakening shaped the worldview of the American body 
politic thereby influencing the formation of policy.120  One of the core tenets of the Second Great 
Awakening was millennialism, or a belief in the impending Second Coming of Christ 
(Revelation 20).  Due to this eschatological conviction, many at that time firmly believed that 
America had a “unique role to play” in spreading Christianity around the world and ushering in 
the Millennium.121  When such an idea fused with an interpretation of Manifest Destiny that 
ordained America “to disseminate its principles, both religious and secular, abroad,” there came 
a time where support for Christian missionary efforts, particularly in the Middle East, stemmed 
from not only congregations across the country but also from the mainstream press, Congress, 
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and the White House.122  As a result of this blending of religious ideas and foreign policy, 
military and diplomatic power began to serve the spread of American religion in the Middle 
East.123  Middle Eastern governments proving inhospitable towards American missionaries in the 
region (who were not only proselytizing religiously but also making disciples of the civic faith 
through Western style academic institutions) would face diplomatic pressures or a brazen show 
of force from United States Navy warships dropping anchor off shore.  Additionally, between the 
dispensational belief that Americans were morally obligated to assist the Jewish people in 
returning to Palestine (due to it being a prerequisite for the return of Christ)124 and the State 
Department’s notion that the Jews constituted a “natural link between Christian America and the 
Muslim Middle East,”125 advocacy for and defense of the descendants of Abraham also became a 
policy concern of the United States.  Simply put, the Manifest Destiny era was characterized as 
“the confluence of divinely ordained missions and state-sanctioned might.”126 
 This does not mean, however, that the sacred and/or civic faith(s) of America were never 
compromised or called into question.  For instance the decision to withhold assistance from the 
Greeks rebelling under the oppression and authoritarianism of the Ottoman Empire served to 
highlight the internal philosophical struggle that the U.S. would seek to balance for years to 
come – pursuing its own national interests versus epitomizing and promoting Western values.  
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Even though many Americans viewed Greece as their cultural birthplace, considered the Greeks’ 
journey towards independence as synonymous with their own recent revolution, and regarded the 
Greeks as “latter-day crusaders” combatting the tyrannical Muslim barbarians, the pragmatic 
foreign policy objectives of the day (e.g. endeavoring towards a U.S.-Ottoman treaty, attempting 
to avoid provoking the European powers that considered the Middle East its sphere of influence, 
etc.) caused President Monroe to deny the Greek’s request for assistance citing it as an “internal 
European affair.”127  However, the greatest moral threat to the American identity in the 19th 
Century would not stem from foreign policy but rather a domestic issue. 
America’s foundational claim that all men “are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights” seemed nothing short of political rhetoric when placed in juxtaposition with 
the concept that a man, on the basis of his skin color, could be forced into servitude to his fellow 
man and regarded as nothing less than a piece of property to be treated in whatever manner 
deemed acceptable by the owner.  The debate erupting from this inhumanity was met with 
differing and irreconcilable moral opinions.  For the southern, slave-holding states, there was a 
passionate outcry because they saw their agrarian economies threatened by a possible loss of 
their labor force.  Many of those opposed to the practice, responded with an organized and united 
front, the Abolitionist Movement being one such example.  This contested issue, ultimately 
leading to the Civil War, jeopardized America’s future identity in two key ways: “The survival 
of the United States as one nation was at risk, and on the outcome of the war depended the 
nation's ability to bring to reality the ideals of liberty, equality, human dignity, and justice.”128  
The most tangible issue was the risk it presented of splitting the United States into two separate 	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countries: the United States and the Confederate States of America.  With regards to “liberty, 
equality, human dignity, and justice,” it presented a potential shift in the American values 
paradigm.  For America to proclaim that she is a land where “all” men are given the right to 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” by God, yet also maintains that one man can 
arbitrarily own another is an unstable foundation for a country’s moral identity.  Had the Union 
not been victorious the America known as the “leader of the free world” would most likely have 
never come into existence.  Sadly, the resolve of the South adamantly defended the atrocious 
practice of human property to the point it took four years of war to determine the nation’s fate. 
 During the extensive reconstruction period after the Civil War, the damaged national 
infrastructure dictated that the forces of the North to occupy the South.  Unfortunately, this did 
not cauterize the wounds inflicted by the war but instead allowed for a moral fissure to develop 
and further stifle the recovery efforts and the return to a collective American identity.  In some 
cases, officers of the Union army confiscated Confederate land and placed them in the ownership 
of former slaves – “partly to punish rebels, partly to hinder the South economically, and partly 
because they had come to regard slavery as an immoral theft of the slave's labor.”129  Thus, 
despite the surge in patriotism and national identity development during the Monroe Doctrine 
and Manifest Destiny era, from the reconstruction period to the early 1900s the American 
identity was in a state of maintenance and repair rather than acceleration and growth. 
20th Century America 
This century would contain the most defining series of events for the term “American.”  
Unfortunately, it would also contain the apex of growth for the identity of the United States and 
its subsequent degradation.  “We are not used to seeing World War One as an ideological 	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struggle, a battle between democracy and autocracy.  Yet that is in many respects exactly what it 
was.”130  For this reason, the United States’ entry to the First World War initiated a chain of 
events that would eventually lead to the implosion of America’s identity. 
Historians attribute the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary as 
the immediate catalyst for the initiation of WWI.  Tension and anxiety amongst the European 
powers were elevated to the point that the assassination of a national figure in Sarajevo was 
enough to upset the precipitously balanced European theater.  Once involved, the United States 
aligned itself with France and Britain, bastions of “Western values,” against the power grabs of 
the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires.  Thus the Allied victory was not simply a 
victory of nations but also a symbolic victory for freedom and a certain way of life.  Despite its 
late arrival to the conflict, it also placed America and President Woodrow Wilson in a position to 
lead the world from the ashes of war into a new era.  Seizing the opportunity, Wilson leveraged 
his positional authority and progressive zeal to devise a plan for sanctions against Germany and 
the other defeated nations.  The victors sought restitution and the reorganization of European 
structure in order to prevent another conflict.  These two goals were merged into a single postwar 
effort: replacing balance of power with collective security.  As Wilson pontificated: “the balance 
of power is the great game now forever discredited.  It’s the old and evil order that prevailed 
before this war.  The balance of power is a thing that we can do without in the future.”131 
But as discussed previously, the collective security framework and “the war to end all 
wars” did not deter future conflicts.  Ironically, the progressive belief that the balance of power 
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treated “nations like cheeses to be cut up for political convenience”132 actually became the modus 
operandi of those espousing collective security.  For instance, the treaties of Versailles, Trianon, 
and Saint Germain imposed severe sanctions on Germany’s economy and territory; detached 
Austria and Hungary, formally dissolving the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and appropriated over 
two-thirds of Hungary’s land holdings to bordering nations.  In short, WWI reshaped the 
European continent not only through its infamous trench warfare but also through the 
geopolitical gerrymandering of the victors.  However borders were not only redrawn in Europe 
but also in the Middle East – a shift not only in the international landscape but yet another 
environment where socially defined national interests would drive foreign policy development. 
As accounted for in Part 1, the progressive understanding of collective security and a 
liberal world order finds its sustainment in the philosophy of the West.  Although it would be 
entirely inaccurate to portray the imperially focused British and French as benevolent and 
altruistic when they had undeniable economic aspirations for the region, particularly with regards 
to petroleum production, it would be equally inaccurate to disregard the role that Western ideas 
played during the aftermath of WWI.  Generally speaking, the U.S. saw European imperialism as 
a force that would lead to positive change in the Middle East; many Americans in the late 1800s 
were looking to European nations (i.e. Christendom) to colonize the Middle East, thereby freeing 
the oppressed from the despotic rule of Islam and shaping the region to resemble the Western 
world133  (ex. Woodrow Wilson’s belief that Providence had set aside a special place in history 
for America and that he as president was responsible for fulfilling enlightened democratic 
objectives – hence his embarkation upon a “crusade for democracy” against the Islamic Ottoman 
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Empire and its allies134).  Simply put, American idealism and the commitment to the spread of its 
values globally underpinned much of pre-WWII foreign policy, to include the support for British 
and French administration of the Levant and modern day Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 
 Although the borders of the post-WWI settlement “have proven remarkably resilient,” if 
the modern Middle East’s origin is to be understood comprehensively it must be acknowledged 
that the imperial powers of Europe imposed both the borders and systems of government for the 
majority of states in the region.135  In other words, the Western powers made the East resemble 
the West through Westphalian borders and liberal concepts of government.  More specifically, 
the post-war partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was the result of extensive Allied negotiations, 
with each partition agreement intertwined with a specific wartime context:  
The Constantinople Agreement of 1915 when the Allies anticipated the quick conquest of 
Istanbul; the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence in 1915 and 1916 when the British 
needed a Muslim ally against the Ottoman jihad; the Balfour Declaration in 1917 when 
the British wanted to revise the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to secure Palestine 
for British rule.136 
 
Yet not even these agreements (or more accurately, the people that brokered them) were immune 
to the power and influence of ideas. 
For example, dispensational theology and the associated eschatological implications 
made British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour more receptive to the notion of establishing a 
Jewish home in the area known as Palestine.137  That said, analysis of this key document is easily 
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oversimplified if one superficially concludes that it was predominately a state-sanctioned 
endorsement of religion.  To the contrary, while the religious convictions of Balfour and others 
were undoubtedly influential, political and strategic concerns were also at work.  “Balfour 
combined zealous religious beliefs with a firm sense of realpolitik” (i.e. the bequeathing of 
Palestine to the Jews would not only summon the Messiah but also further British imperial 
objectives); his plan to create a Jewish home in Palestine (regardless of whether it was 
administered by an international regime, Britain, or an Anglo-American partnership) afforded 
considerable protection to the Suez Canal and Britain’s economic interests in the region.138  
Additionally, appealing to the Western desire for freedom, the Russian pogroms and 
authoritarianism of the Ottoman Empire highlighted the pragmatic humanitarian need for a safe 
haven for Abraham’s descendants.  Last but not least, the pro-Zionist constituencies in both the 
U.S. and Britain wielded considerable political influence over their respective governments, 
thereby influencing the foreign policy of both nations.  Ultimately, these ideas and circumstances 
stirred in Balfour a conviction that the case for a Jewish home in Palestine was so uniquely 
exceptional that it overrode the inherent right of self-determination for the Arab population 
already residing there.139  The resulting Balfour Declaration would serve as an ad hoc legal 
framework for Britain’s conquest of the Middle East from the document’s issuance until its 
inclusion in the mandate given to England during the 1920 San Remo Conference.140  Its 
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importance to the founding of a Jewish homeland and the development of Western foreign policy 
towards the Middle East notwithstanding, the impact of this document was arguably “one of 
miscalculation and unintended consequences.”141 
 Although the declaration was marketed to the British government as though President 
Wilson overtly supported it, the “official” U.S. approval of the pro-Zionist stance came from 
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (a close friend and advisor to Wilson).  It was not until the 1922 
joint resolution of Congress endorsing the Balfour Declaration and the 1924 U.S. treaty 
recognizing the British Mandate that the Palestinian policy of the collective U.S. government 
would be set in motion.142  This left Britain to push for a Jewish homeland with little more than 
the verbal support from President Wilson that did not begin openly until almost a year after the 
Balfour Declaration was presented.  As Great Britain sought to destabilize the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire by assisting in the instigation of the Arab Revolt and the U.S. endeavored to 
abstain from a declared state of war with Turkey, England found itself in a politically tenuous 
position having promised land to both the Jews and the Arab nationalists – factions that by and 
large were regarded as mutually exclusive.  Even though Balfour promised that “nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities,”143 
the Arab majority in Palestine believed that it could in no way be safeguarded by a Jewish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2016, http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/BalfourDeclaration_eng.htm. 
 
 141. James Renton, “Should Britain Apologize for the Balfour Declaration?,” Haaretz, 
April 29, 2013, accessed April 12, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/should-britain 
-apologize-for-the-balfour-declaration.premium-1.518145. 
 
 142. Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897, 303. 
 
 143. Arthur Balfour, “Balfour Declaration 1917,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 12, 
2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp. 
 	  
52 
movement that intended to dispossess them via immigration and land purchases.144  As a result, 
the region would continue to be plagued by sectarian violence for decades to come. 
 Such was the geopolitical environment during the interwar years.  The efforts of the 
League of Nations proved ahead of their time and the organization failed to stabilize the world.  
European nations were struggling to forge new identities within the borders freshly carved from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  German nationalism was rising and “it chafed against the 
punitive measures of the Versailles Treaty that had ended World War I.”145  America’s idealistic 
endeavor to be a beacon of freedom and justice for the world continued, but this was an 
opportunity afforded by the underwritten security provided by the British and French.  Yet as the 
size of these two imperial powers continued to expand around the globe – especially in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East – the extent of their imperial overstretch would prove irreconcilable. 
 But America was beginning to show symptoms of a societal shift in perceptions and 
beliefs; the influence of religion and the common belief in a God-given right to “life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness” was beginning to wane.  One example was the Scopes Trial and the 
social culture surrounding it. 
Who would dominate American culture--the modernists or the traditionalists?  Journalists 
were looking for a showdown, and they found one in a Dayton, Tennessee courtroom in 
the summer of 1925.  There a jury was to decide the fate of John Scopes, a high school 
biology teacher charged with illegally teaching the theory of evolution.  The guilt or 
innocence of John Scopes, and even the constitutionality of Tennessee’s anti-evolution 
statute, mattered little.  The meaning of the trial emerged through its interpretation as a 
conflict of social and intellectual values.146 	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Challenging the permissibility of a public school teacher offering the theory of evolution as a 
scientifically viable option, this court case legitimized providing alternatives to religious theories 
for the origin of the universe.  In other words, many Americans began seeking processes 
considered intellectual rather than faith-based.  Another key example was the implementation of 
The New Deal in response to the Great Depression.  Embracing the crisis, the Progressive 
movement justified governmental intervention into the economy through Social Security and 
unemployment programs, thereby introducing egalitarian redistribution policies contrary to the 
free enterprise and limited government concepts fundamental to the American way of life. 
 Thus the foreign and domestic policy arenas of the United States (and of the Western 
World in general) were in limbo at the outbreak of World War II.  As with the First, the Second 
World War began as a war on the other side of the Atlantic.  President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt wavered between an obsession with domestic issues and Wilsonian internationalism, 
“between the pursuit of American ideals and a hardnosed realpolitik” (hence Herbert Hoover 
description of FDR as “a chameleon on plaid”).147  Generally speaking, his first two terms were 
spent focused internally.  Even as many of America’s potential adversaries became involved in 
the amassing of arms and forging of multilateral alliances, the U.S. was not only unprepared 
militarily to respond to a crisis but FDR foot stomped the 1940 campaign trail with the pledge: “I 
shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign 
wars.”148  Instead he pioneered the controversial legislation entitled “An Act to Promote the 
Defense of the United States” (i.e. the Lend-Lease program), whereby the U.S. would outfit 
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Great Britain with materials for the war in Europe without risking American lives.  Defending 
his proposal in a fireside chat in December of 1940, FDR attempted to assuage national 
apprehension and rally support by stating: “Our national policy is not directed toward war.  Its 
sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people.”149 
 This changed, however, on December 7, 1941.  Filled with an unshakeable determination, 
America’s entry to WWII and her wartime policies resulted in one of the most definitive displays 
of her national identity.  America stood united against her newfound foe, the Japanese, and 
refused to be defeated at home or abroad.  On December 7 and 8, Roosevelt signed orders 
empowering the FBI to arrest resident aliens that it deemed “dangerous to public peace or safety” 
(over 2,000 Japanese immigrants were incarcerated within the next four days alone). 150 
Regardless of the constitutionality of such internment operations, the point that must be 
understood from this practice is the lengths that America was willing to go to in order to defend 
herself.  This generation understood and embodied the principles contained within Huntington’s 
“We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom 
we are against.”151  The fervency of the American resolve continued all the more when Germany 
became a recognized enemy.  War bond sales skyrocketed; the female workforce, collectively 
symbolized in Rosie The Riveter, took to industry to support the war effort; and cultural icons, 
such as Captain America, emerged onto the scene as manifestations of all America represents.  
The nation stood united against the embodiment of tyranny that was the Axis powers but 
simultaneously struggled to balance its internal quest for freedom and justice with the moral 	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compromise of decisions advantageous to domestic and global security. 
 As the war progressed, this delicate balance and the situation at hand eventually drove the 
Allies to partner with Joseph Stalin – not because of his human rights record but because he, 
having been recently double-crossed by Hitler, was a pragmatic partner of convenience to 
counter the Third Reich.  This placed the Allies on treacherous philosophical ground, making it 
somewhat difficult to sustain the fundamentally moral argument fueling the war against Hitler. 
Assigning to Hitler the label of absolute evil; that feeling was in the air during and after 
World War II.  The historian, Ralph Raico, observed this emotional phenomenon: “A 
moral postulate of our time is that in pursuit of the destruction of Hitler, all things are 
permissible.  Yet why is it self-evident that morality required a crusade against Hitler in 
1939 and 1940, and not against Stalin?  At that point Hitler had slain his thousands but 
Stalin had already slain millions.”152 
 
Nevertheless, the focus was Hitler as seen in Churchill’s sentiment: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I 
would at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”153  Thus, one 
must carefully consider the possibility that WWII was waged not as a human rights campaign but 
a liberation campaign countering power politics and territorial encroachment. 
 “In reading the records of FDR’s speeches about Nazi Germany before Pearl Harbor, one 
is struck by the absence of outrage on the issue of human rights; Roosevelt’s anger at Hitler is 
almost entirely directed at the Nazi chieftain’s foreign policy – his wars of conquest.”154  This 
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interpretation is consistent with other of Roosevelt’s foreign policy decisions – his balancing of 
American idealism and internationalism.  For example, FDR saw the Middle East as an arena of 
power politics, religious and inter-societal animosities, and a critical supplier for the increasing 
demand for oil, he crafted his foreign policy toward the region pragmatically and set America on 
course to assume the role as the leading superpower.155  FDR’s commitment to a liberal foreign 
economic policy that sought to reduce trade barriers and foster an economically interdependent 
world of prosperity found great compatibility with his convictions regarding the Middle East and 
America’s role in the post-WWII community of nations.156  He extended the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter to Middle Eastern nations (a sentiment not shared by Winston Churchill) and 
advocated for the universal rights of self-determination and self-government for all peoples.157  
In addition to exporting Western ideals abroad, there also existed a Westphalian belief that the 
establishment of nation states in the Middle East would further U.S. interests by fostering a 
stable region conducive to world trade and thereby reduce the need for military intervention.  It 
was this vision that ultimately led FDR to meet with Ibn Saud and personally broker a deal in 
which the U.S. would provide support and military training for Saudi Arabia in exchange for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
children of Abraham.  When in the summer of 1939, the S.S. St. Louis, a mercy ship carrying 
937 Europeans, mostly Jews, sought haven in the Caribbean, it was rejected.  The ship’s officers 
frantically cabled the White House and sent two individuals to personally petition the President 
for assistance.  Roosevelt refused even to acknowledge their statements; the United States Coast 
Guard was ordered to prevent any escapees from leaving the ship.” 
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petroleum and political support in the region.158  Although this U.S.-Saudi partnership did 
involve the moral compromise of America not assisting the Jewish quest to return to Palestine (at 
least during FDR’s administration), it established a key security partnership that continues even 
to this day.  More importantly, it was FDR’s struggle between isolationism and internationalism 
that progressively laid the foundation for America’s role in the post-WWII era. 
When FDR died on April 12, 1945, Harry Truman unexpectedly became the primary 
resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.  He also inherited the responsibility of leading America’s 
involvement in the conclusion of WWII.  Convinced that the U.S. was the product of a divine 
appointment, Truman formulated his foreign policy around the belief that democracy and its 
civic principles constitute a God-given system he described as “a matter of faith – a faith in the 
soul of man, faith in human rights.”159  Stemming directly from this worldview, Truman later 
declared the 1947 doctrine bearing his name that firmly established America’s resolve to provide 
military, political, and economic aid to all democracies threatened by internal or external 
authoritarian forces.160  That said, as the allies emerged victorious from WWII, the alliance 
between the United States, Britain, and Russia no longer possessed a common enemy to hold it 
together.  With Hitler defeated, the only bond holding them together were their differing views 
for the post-WWII world – differences that would set the stage for a 45-year ideological conflict 
and force the world to preemptively chose sides in the event the war ever went “hot.”  As the 
victors divvied up the spoils of war, similar to the geographic demarcations taking place after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 158. Adam Taylor, “The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King,” The Washington 
Post, January 27, 2015, accessed April 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/the-first-time-a-u-s-president-met-a-saudi-king. 
 
 159. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 476. 
 
 160. U.S. Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” Office of the Historian, 
accessed April 16, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine. 
 	  
58 
WWI, it was decided that the Allied forces would occupy the territories their troops had 
liberated, installing democratic governments, while the areas liberated by Russia would be 
occupied by the Soviets with communist governments being established.161 
 This marked a key transition in modern world history.  Up to this point, America was 
afforded the opportunity to cleave unto its ideals because its allies, namely Britain and France, 
were underwriting global security.  However, WWII proved an irrecoverable fault line in both 
empires and demonstrated the extent of their respective imperial overstretch.  The material 
hardships after WWII combined with the definitive ascendance of the two “anti-imperial” 
powers, the United States (e.g. extending the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Middle 
East, the Truman Doctrine, etc.) and the Soviet Union, and “with the increased maturity of 
nationalist elites throughout Africa and Asia to force a decided retrenchment of Europe 
overseas.”162  France and its constitutional understanding of law derived from the Roman 
Empire’s notion of jus gentium (“the law for all peoples, based on a set of principles given out 
from the hub of the empire and applicable to all within it”) were caught unprepared for the anti-
colonialism of the post-1945 world and would see almost two decades of uprisings and turmoil 
within its holdings in the Middle East, Indochina, and Africa.163  Similarly, the British would opt 
to reduce its overseas holdings as seen in the formulation of the Indian Independence Act that 
partitioned British India into the two independent nations of India and Pakistan in 1947 and, 
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exhausted by the fighting between Arabs and Jews and the perpetual opposition to the Mandatory 
government, terminating its administration of Palestine in 1948 almost three months earlier than 
the withdrawal deadline codified in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181.164  In short, 
decolonization handed the proverbial “reins” to the U.S. as the leading superpower of the post-
WWII community of nations. 
 Initially, Truman took to this newfound role moderately well.  His influence and 
diplomatic maneuverings proved critical in navigating the post-WWII implosion of the Anglo-
American-French-Soviet front that had so successfully countered Hitler’s advances in the Middle 
East.165  Moreover, the self-determination of the newly independent states enabled the U.S. to 
play the role of “offshore balancer” in the region (i.e. maintaining close security ties with several 
countries and actively preventing any one nation, particularly the U.S.S.R., from dominating the 
region reduced the likelihood of a unilateral halt of the oil supplied to international markets).166 
Despite their differing views regarding the Jews’ and Palestine, Truman continued nurturing the 
relationship with Ibn Saud that FDR had initiated just months prior to his death.167  Last but not 
least, Truman’s Zionist beliefs fused with the humanitarian aftermath of the Holocaust (along 
with other geopolitical influences) and caused him to disregard the possibility of forfeiting 
America’s standing in the Arab world and recognize Israel’s de facto authority. 
Unfortunately, over time this hybrid liberal balance of power approach undermined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 164. Marcia Gelpe, The Israeli Legal System (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 
2013), 28. 
 
 165. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 477-80. 
 
 166. Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Middle East Strategy: Back to Balancing,” Foreign Policy, 
November 21, 2013, accessed April 16, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/21/u-s-middle 
-east-strategy-back-to-balancing. 
 
 167. Taylor, “The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King.” 
 	  
60 
America’s promotion of freedom and justice as it has forced the U.S. to count amongst its allies 
some of the most abusive authoritarian regimes in the modern era (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.).  
Additionally, the promotion of Western institutions, particularly democratic elections, in 
conjunction with encouraging self-determination lead to the empowerment of ideas and positions 
contrary to American ideals.  In short, America assuming responsibility to underwrite security 
for the world would prove paradoxical, particularly when juxtaposed with the ideological 
essence of the Cold War.  While America would seek to embody freedom and justice in contrast 
to the oppression and despotism of the U.S.S.R., the pragmatic decisions made behind the scenes 
to counter Soviet influence and facilitate security (ex. the Central Intelligence Agency’s coup 
d’etat in Iran) did not always align with its founding ideals. 
 In hindsight, the Cold War has been defined as an ideological war between democracy, 
along with its free enterprise economic counterpart, and the totalitarian model of communism, 
with its economic school of thought bearing the same name.  America openly declared war on 
the ideology and the resulting foreign policy model was that of containment (ex. the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War, and the Bay of Pigs were instances of hard power employed to counter 
Moscow).  Domestically, although never interred in a manner similar to the Japanese living in 
America, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies actively tracked American Communists. 
Intelligence investigations dominated the FBI caseload and focused on monitoring radical 
activists and organizations and their efforts to influence public policy (specifically, their 
opposition to U.S. foreign policy and internal security initiatives).  Although intended to 
weed out potentially disloyal government employees, these investigations extended to 
individuals employed in the private sector – notably, artists, writers, college and 
university professors, and news reports – targeted because they “might influence others 
against the national interest or are likely to furnish financial aid to subversive 
elements.”168 
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Put another way, security officials and political leaders understood that ideas influence behavior.  
Ironically, while the Cold War was yet another opportunity for American ideals to permeate 
throughout the world, these four decades proved to be the period of time where America would 
abandon the foundation of its original identity and begin exchanging it for a different one. 
 More specifically, the 1960s marked the turning point for the national identity of the 
United States. 
The 60s were the age of youth, as 70 million children from the post-war baby boom 
became teenagers and young adults.  The movement away from the conservative fifties 
continued and eventually resulted in revolutionary ways of thinking and real change in 
the cultural fabric of American life.  No longer content to be images of the generation 
ahead of them, young people wanted change.  The changes affected education, values, 
lifestyles, laws, and entertainment.169 
 
Desiring to be free of the perceived bondage placed on them by their parent’s generation, the 
youth of the baby boom rallied to a cause all their own.  The result was a decade characterized by 
free-spirited youth infatuated with drugs, alcohol, sexual liberation, and anti-war protests.  This 
shift in thought processes was also arguably the initial precursor to postmodernism.170  
Consequently, there gradually emerged a proportional relationship with the advancement of the 
postmodern mindset and the increasing scrutiny and indifference levied against the traditional 
(and intrinsically religious) foundations of the American way of life. 
 By the end of the Cold War, the identities and ideological foundations of countless 
nations had been shaken to their very core.  The self-determination of peoples endorsed by the 
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United States after WWII had left many countries to define themselves both based on internal 
preferences and which side they chose in the standoff between the U.S. and the Soviets.  With 
the collapse of the U.S.S.R. the external influence vanished essentially overnight.  Again,  
In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not 
ideological, political, or economic.  They are cultural.  Peoples and nations are attempting 
to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we?  And they are 
answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by 
reference to the things that mean most to them.171 
 
This presents a deeper level of analysis than those who argue that “without Christianity the Cold 
War would not have ended peacefully.”172  Without a doubt, there was an ideological component 
to the termination of the Cold War. 
As [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn and the leaders of the Velvet Revolution saw with a clarity 
chiseled in courage, there were only two ways to bring down the might of Soviet tyranny.  
One was to trump Soviet force physically, which was impossible for a tiny handful of 
dissidents in a day of SS-20 missiles and the KGB.  The other was to counter physical 
force with moral, staking their stand on the conviction that truth would outweigh lies and 
the whole machinery of propaganda, deception, and terror.  They chose the latter.173 
 
Yet if Christianity and religion was the catalyst for the end of the Cold War, one would expect 
that a post-secular Europe would have emerged during the 1990s instead of a unipolar world 
“marching to the tune of the mostly secular values of the victor: freedom, pluralism and liberal 
democratic capitalism.”174  Moreover, considering the abundance of structural reasons (e.g. 
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political, social, economic, etc.) and the reality that virtually no one foresaw the impending 
Soviet collapse,175 any attempt to retroactively attribute a singular cause to the end of the War 
may be a mismanagement of the seam between Occam’s Razor and irreducible complexity. 
 While the communist policies of Moscow had undeniable effects on the economic and 
social structures of the Soviet Union that contributed to its destabilization, a truly ideological 
victory would expectantly generate a world consistent with Fukuyama’s predictions in “The End 
of History?.”  Although this utopian dream did not come to fruition, it does not mean that leaders 
at the time did not attempt to bring it about by combining liberal ideas with governmental action.  
One of the most noteworthy instances of this post-Cold War mentality was George H. W. Bush’s 
response to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein.  Speaking before a joint session of 
Congress in the 1991 State of the Union, he argued: “What is at stake is more than one small 
country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common 
cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule 
of law.  Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children’s future.”176 
21st Century America 
 Politically speaking, America began the new millennium contentiously.  For one, the 
presidential election would be decided by the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have their philosophical roots in Western Christendom, as demonstrated in the Introduction and 
Part 1, at the end of the Cold War and even to this day they are largely understood to be 
“secular” and are therefore treated as such here. 
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More significantly, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 thrust America into a new era of 
foreign policy and military strategy.  Taking a pluralistic approach, President Bush convened a 
press conference to deny any linkage between the religion of Islam and the attack on the 
American homeland, saying: “Islam is peace.  These terrorists don’t represent peace.  They 
represent evil and war”177 (President Obama would hold a similar position in his National 
Security Strategy, in which he rejects “the lie that America and its allies are at war with 
Islam”178).  Additionally, taking up the “New World Order” charge laid down by his father, Bush 
rallied coalitions of nations to both topple the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to 
disrupt the safe haven provided to Al Qaeda (and others) in Afghanistan.  In short, the post-
WWII leading superpower imposed a new geopolitical framework upon two different nations in 
the name of freedom, democracy, and security.  However, considering that the implementation of 
these decisions is still on going (not to mention the unintended consequences that are still to be 
dealt with), this portion of the discussion will be completed in Parts 3 and 4. 
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Part 3 
Deconstructing the Middle East 
 
Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in a society, rather, in a nation; 
for man does not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which is not seen 
materialized in a living society.  From this point of view, we can say that the Muslim 
community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does not 
denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers 
lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time.  It is the name of a group of people 
whose manners, ideas, and concepts, rules and regulations, values and criteria, are all 
derived from the Islamic source.  The Muslim community with these characteristics 
vanished at the moment the laws of God became suspended on earth. 
 
–Sayyid Qutb, Milestones 
 
 Historically and philosophically speaking, the nation state system is Western.  Yet 
looking at modern geography one might erroneously conclude that the principles and ideas 
leading to the nation state system are universal, hence the nearly 200 “sovereign states” around 
the globe.  To the contrary, as demonstrated in the aforementioned chapters the nation state 
system is nothing short of an export – a product marketed to (or forced upon) the world by the 
leadership of the Western World over the course of hundreds of years.  With regards to the 
Middle East, the nations seen today are the result of World War I.  Although the victorious 
powers seized the Ottoman Empire and divided much of its territory as spoils of war, the 
Western methodology of demarcation did not permeate the fabric of society and consequently 
the people and ideas they espouse remain Middle Eastern.  Therefore, the intent of this chapter is 
not to survey the entire history of a nation as done in Part 2 but instead examine the prevailing 
worldviews and ideas within the “case studies” of Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, and 
Transnational Terrorism in order to later address sources of contention in the dealings between 
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the United States as the leading power in the West and the Middle East as a, in Huntington 
terminology, “Civilization” (Part 4. Reconciling the West and the Middle East). 
Afghanistan 
 Appearing in a myriad of sources, there is a regularly occurring cliché that Afghanistan is 
“the graveyard of empires.”179  Yet considering Alexander the Great (330 B.C.), the Arabs (667 
A.D.), Genghis Khan (1220), the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880, 1919), the 
Soviets (1979-1989), and arguably operations by the United States and its allies (2003-Present), 
the cliché is not without its apparent points of validity.180  In fact, while a dogmatic “graveyard 
of empires” approach to Afghanistan would be an egregious oversimplification, the social forces 
and dynamics of the country that have caused difficulties for governments, both foreign and 
domestic, to maintain order and control must be understood when analyzing the country. 
 In 1928-1929, as a result of a bloody civil war involving Kabul being laid siege and tribal 
uprisings in Jalalabad, the British dispatched the Royal Air Force to evacuate its embassy 
personnel and expatriate community.181  With the meddling British expelled, Afghans began a 
period of time during which they controlled their own affairs with a reduced level of foreign 
interference.  This period also coincided with the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933-1973).  
Despite the isolated and financially inhibited status of Afghanistan when he succeeded his slain 
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father and the reality that he would enjoy one of the longest stints on a world throne, Zahir’s 
reign would be undermined by cousins and uncles exerting power politically and militarily.182  
With regards to positives, his time in power would see the successful securement of 
developmental aid from both America and the Soviets, “a remarkable achievement during the 
Cold War struggle for influence at the strategic Asian crossroads.”183  However the significance 
of this individual’s administration lies not in his geopolitical successes or even his failures but in 
“the eyebrow-raising things: allowing women, in 1959, to discard the veil if they wanted to, 
letting raunchy Western films into the country, permitting wine production and, from 1963, 
gently half-easing the cork from that potent brew called democracy.”184 
 Ultimately, attempts to liberalize Afghanistan all but stopped when Mohammed Daud 
Khan overthrew King Zahir via military coup and forced him into exile in 1973.  Although he 
had served as prime minister under Zahir, even maliciously reducing the King to a mere 
figurehead, Daud’s tenure was not welcomed by many – facing multiple coup attempts during 
his first years in power, continual challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood, and was eventually 
unseated and killed in 1978 by members of the Afghan Communist party and portions of the 
military loyal to the top air force general.185  In 1979, the U.S.S.R. invaded. 
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The Soviets along with their Communist allies within Afghanistan would go on to 
decimate entire communities, devastate large swaths of the countryside, and send millions of 
refugees across the various borders through its systematic targeting of elites and traditional 
institutions.186  These communist efforts to impose their utopian systems upon an extremely 
traditional society would launch what has been characterized as Afghanistan’s “first national 
insurgency” (i.e. previous rebellions and counter-foreign invasion movements had been confined 
within regions north and east of Kabul while the Soviet occupation encountered resistance from 
all ethnic groups and throughout the entire country).187  At the center of this resistance movement 
was the mujahideen (“Arabic mujāhidīn, plural of mujāhid, literally, person who wages 
jihad”188).  Although this group of individuals was not in and of themselves capable of routing 
the quantitatively and technologically superior Red Army, suffering an estimated one million 
civilian, 90,000 Mujahideen, and 18,000 Afghan troops vis-à-vis the 14,500 Soviet losses during 
the 9-year conflict, they did serve as a formidable proxy for the United States (along with Iran, 
Pakistan, China, and others) to channel supplies and weapons in the overarching effort to contain 
Soviet expansionism.189 
This alliance of convenience proved useful as an impediment to the U.S.S.R. but did little 
for the health and longevity of Afghanistan, for as soon as the Russians retreated the unified 	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insurgency fractured into warring factions vying for control in the post Cold War power vacuum.  
Despite the absence of direct U.S. involvement in the war, America did continue to exert 
influence through allies (particularly Pakistan) and more importantly accepted the reality that the 
Islamic warfighters that had been organized to combat the Soviets would govern Afghanistan.190  
Emerging victorious from the infighting in 1996 was a group known as the Taliban, a group who 
some argued only won on the basis that those outside the southern regions wanted their lands 
pacified but would be described by refugees as “they called themselves religious leaders. . . . 
They would swear on the Qur’an.  But they weren’t Muslims.  Dogs wouldn’t do what they 
did.”191  Nonetheless this group, consisting almost entirely from the ethnic Pushtun tribes 
straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the largest single tribe composing roughly half of 
the nation’s twenty-five million people, maintained de facto control of the country (changing the 
name from the Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan); provided a 
level of authoritarian domestic security (albeit one with no corresponding administrative capacity 
for support to society); secured some international recognition to the point of pseudo-embassy 
representation in Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and somewhere in Queens, New York.192  
Regrettably, this organization and the environment it espoused also provided a safe haven for 
another group: Al-Qaeda. 
Following the events of 9/11, the United States would find itself aligned against the very 
people that it utilized to counter the Soviets.  Moreover, because the U.S. began Operation 	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ENDURING FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror with insufficient time for American 
forces to serve as the primary force (barely 30 days after the terrorist attacks), Washington had to 
make arrangements with those who opposed the Taliban – those defeated during the Afghan civil 
war (e.g. the Northern Alliance, a group who had continued close relations with the Russians; 
Shite groups in western Afghanistan who found support in relations with Iran and India; and 
other various groups and subgroups throughout the country).193  Even after the major NATO and 
American military offensives began, the tribes continued to play a pivotal role in waging the war 
in Afghanistan.  General David Petraeus would eventually operationalize a 2009 academic paper 
“One Tribe at a Time” by Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant.  Referring to him as the 
“Lawrence of Afghanistan,”194 Petraeus agreed with Gant’s field observation that the tribes were 
apprehensive to trust symbols of the central government such as the Afghan National Army and 
Afghan National Police (also the entities the U.S. was training and equipping) and subsequently 
authorized a paradigm shift in accordance with Gant’s postulation: “Why continue to work 
against the tribal structures and traditions already in place?  Not only let the tribes protect 
themselves, but encourage it” 195 (a sentiment shared by many at the time, to include Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates: “My worry is that the Afghans come to see us as part of the problem, 
rather than as part of the solution.  And then we are lost”196). 
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 But this model would prove unsustainable.  As the counter-insurgency doctrine fell into 
disfavor at the Pentagon and White House, the price tags associated with nation-building and 
tribal engagement proved more costly than many were willing to pay (ex. President Obama 
stating in January 2012 that “we’re turning a page on a decade of war” and signing a new 
national defense strategy titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense”).197  Yet even as the NATO mandate expired, the U.S. ceased combat operations and 
began withdrawing forces, and the Afghans conducted the 2014 elections in which the nation 
would transfer power democratically for the first time, the tribes are still the building block of 
society.  Analysis of candidates during Afghan presidential elections is contextualized by which 
tribes a given candidate polls well and/or poorly.198  By late 2015, the Taliban as a “conservative 
Pashtun movement” was rallying support in southern and eastern Afghanistan, but the Tajik, 
Uzbek, and Hazara areas of the central, northern, and western regions align more so with current 
President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul.199  Even as the Islamic State continues to expand 
its sphere of influence throughout the Middle East, the caliphate’s attempts to secure a foothold 
in Afghanistan have proven somewhat unsuccessful on the basis that it lacks a tribal constituency 
“given that it’s pan-Islamic, religiously puritanical agenda does, in general, not mesh well with 
tribal traditions.”200  Ultimately, although the future of the country after Western intervention 
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toppled the Taliban is still to be determined, if history is any indication the tribal component of 
the Afghan way of life will remain intact. 
Iraq 
 Residing in the Fertile Crescent, the territory of modern-day Iraq has been occupied for 
the extent of recorded history.  Whether the Babylonians, Persians, or Macedonians, the land of 
Mesopotamia (“land between two rivers” – the Tigris and Euphrates) is one rich in history and 
culture.  Of the more recent empires, Iraq was controlled by the Ottomans.  After World War I it 
was occupied by Britain (an occupation retroactively sanctioned by the international community 
when the League of Nations declared it a British mandate in 1920).  As with many of its holdings 
during this period, twilight cast a shadow over the empire on which the sun never set in the form 
of nationalist movements.  Stemming from the influence of nationalist activities in Syria, 
agitation flowed first into northern Iraq and then into the tribal areas in the middle Euphrates and 
by the summer of 1920 revolts had spread to the entirety of the country with the exception of the 
large cities of Baghdad, Mosul, and Al-Basrah where British forces were garrisoned.201  While 
the revolt was subdued by force, it necessitated that Iraq and Britain reconcile their differences, 
culminating in a 1921 conference chaired by Winston Churchill that decided to crown emir 
Faysal I (exiled from Syria by the French) king of Iraq, provided his “government shall be 
constitutional, representative and democratic” (e.g. respecting freedom of religion and 
missionary endeavors, recognizing the rights of foreigners within its borders, treating all states 
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equally, cooperating with the League of Nations, etc.).202 
 Faysal was crowned king on August 23, 1921, and on October 10, 1922 an Anglo-Iraq 
treaty was signed in order to lay the foundation for an Iraqi constitution (the League of Nations 
required Mandatories “to facilitate their ‘progressive development’ as independent states.  Such a 
provision of course meant that the Mandatory was always under challenge to show that the 
mandated territory was not yet ready ‘to stand alone’”).203  This treaty did not, however, resolve 
the struggle between Britain and the nationalistic aspirations of many within Iraq.  To the 
contrary, tensions remained exacerbated between the two until 1929 when England announced 
that the mandate would be dissolved in 1932 – an idea that came to fruition on October 3, 1932 
when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations. 
 Yet despite an independent hybrid monarchical-representative government, lasting 
stability did not result by default.  Instead, the Hashimite monarch experienced uprisings, coup 
attempts, and protests in 1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, 1956, and would ultimately be overthrown on 
July 14, 1958 by a group of military officers.  Baghdad Radio broadcasted that the Army had 
liberated the people from the oppression of the corrupt group put into office by “imperialism” 
and from that point on Iraq, as a republic, would instead “maintain ties with other Arab 
countries.”204  This revolution radically modified the social structures of Iraq: enhancing the lives 
and position of the middle class, peasants, and urban workers; reviving long-suppressed ethnic, 
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tribal, and sectarian conflicts (especially between Shia and Sunni and between Arabs and Kurds); 
and plunging its leaders into internal dissention because they did not possess a coherent ideology 
or effective organizational structure.205  Though it was referred to as a “republic” the governance 
of Iraq would be conducted by a series of strongmen, the most notable of which being Saddam 
Hussein who consolidated the Ba’thist Party’s power via yet another Iraqi coup in 1968 (the 
Ba’thists had only briefly held power in 1963).206 
 Meaning “renaissance” in Arabic, the Ba’thist ideology is a pan-Arab secular nationalism 
that regards individual Arab states as provinces or regions within the larger Arab nation.207  As 
Saddam and the party solidified control over Iraqi affairs, this not only placed a Sunni-led regime 
to oppress the Kurdish and Shite populations but also bolstered pan-Arab nationalism – neither 
of which placed Iraq on good terms with its Shite and Persian neighbor, Iran.  As a result of the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, the geopolitical tensions between the two would encounter a 
flashpoint.  Saddam Hussein felt threatened by the ascendency of Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
Ayatollah saw Hussein as a Sunni despot oppressing his nation’s Shia majority, thus Saddam 
embarked upon a preemptive solution to the problem by invading Iran in 1980 so as “to 
overthrow the Khomeini regime before that regime could overthrow him.”208  The resulting Iran-
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Iraq War would last from 1980-1988 and evolved from a rudimentary conventional war between 
two states to an internationalized crisis, colloquially referred to in part as “The Tanker War” 
when Iraq began attempting to weaken Iran by neutralizing its capability of using tankers to 
export oil (it was the increased foreign presence in the Gulf and the corresponding steady 
escalation of maritime incidents that served as a major contributing factor in Iran agreeing to a 
ceasefire).209 
 After this war of attrition, Iraq was considerably weakened.  Two years later, Saddam 
would find himself in another international incident after directing the invasion and occupation 
of neighboring Kuwait – only this time the Western powers would be aligned against him.  The 
coalition decisively expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but the decision was made to leave 
Saddam in power and consequently the minority Sunni and Ba’thist regime continued to 
suppress the Shia majority and the Kurds and thereby contributed to the region experiencing a 
level of semi-stability.  Over a decade after the fact, in 2002 Saddam apologized to Kuwait 
urging the emirate “to remain free and faithful by not allying yourself with the aggressors” and 
warned the Kuwaiti people that the U.S. would “steal your wealth and turn you into slaves 
working for them and turn your leaders into local agents for American oil companies.”210  Little 
did he know that the same Americans he slandered would lead another coalition to overthrow 
him the following year. 
 Hindsight being of impeccable acuity, similar to the 1958 revolution that facilitated the 
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post-monarchy power vacuum the 2003 toppling of the Ba’thist regime radically modified the 
social structures of Iraq.  For instance, with the Sunni controlled government ousted, Shia cleric 
Moqtada Sadr and his militia group, the Mehdi Army, attained a level of prominence and 
galvanized anti-U.S. sentiment after the invasion.211  Similarly, in the absence Saddam’s loyal 
and effective security infrastructure the emergence of ISIS met little resistance from the fledgling 
post-2003 government.  Exacerbating the Sunni-led Islamic State situation is the reality that the 
organization gained momentum and freedom of movement due to President Maliki’s “steady 
build-up of a new authoritarian regime within the cloak of democracy in Iraq, and his steady 
increase and violent repression of Sunnis since the 2010 election.”212  Moreover, the 
demographic shift from Sunni to Shia has begun to repair decades of animosity to the point that 
Tehran is providing ground troops and conducting air strikes to battle ISIS and support their 
“friends” – the Iraqi government.213  Simply put, the Western intervention that altered the 
prevailing ideas and worldviews within Iraq has brought about second and third order effects 
domestically, regionally, and globally. 
Egypt 
 Finding its lifeblood in the Nile Egypt stands as one of the world’s oldest civilizations, 
albeit not one consistently operating in accordance with its own autonomy.  Whether the Greeks, 
Romans, or Ottomans, Egypt has often been a territorial holding or puppet state of an empire.  
Forming the only land bridge between Asia and Africa, Egypt has been of strategic value to 	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foreign powers for millennia.  In the late 19th Century, as the Suez Canal opened a maritime 
passage from the Indian Ocean into the Mediterranean, Egypt’s value only continued to increase.  
In 1882, the domestic situation in Egypt was dire (e.g. a mutinous military, a bankrupt treasury, a 
dislocated governance and administration methodology, etc.) and thereby endangering the Canal 
to the point that Britain resolved to occupy the country in a situation described by the Earl of 
Cromer (Britain’s first Viceroy of Egypt) as: “we don’t really want the damned place but if we 
don’t [take control] someone else will grab it and the whole balance of power will be mucked 
up.”214  Some historians and analysts contend that the “security of the canal” argument was a 
diversion attempting to make intervention palatable to certain government officials and the 
general populace while responding to the nationalist threat to either the “Anglo-French dictation 
of Egypt finances”215 or the prestige of Britain being challenged not only in Egypt but also in 
India and “the East.”216  The key contextual takeaway is the foreign, particularly Western, 
interventionism in Egypt’s recent history. 
 This interventionism continued well into the 20th Century as Britain converted its 
occupation of Egypt to a Protectorate in December of 1914.  Egypt’s value (or at least that of the 
Suez Canal) to the West only increased as the British and French expanded their holdings in 
Africa and the Middle East, especially after the First World War.  In February 1922 Britain 
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renounced its Protectorate over Egypt but “it took the British and the Egyptians from February 
1922 to August 1936 to come to an understanding concerning ‘the independence with 
reservations’ granted to Egypt.”217  Even as Egypt began to attain more and more autonomy, by 
the time of WWII Hitler understood that while he could not invade England he could secure 
quality sources of oil, capitalize on the strategic value of the Suez Canal, and possibly arouse the 
Muslim world against the British (and the Zionists) by moving his forces into the Middle East.218  
Although Hitler ultimately lost, the war took its toll upon England as well.  As the sun finally 
began to set on the British Empire, Egyptian nationalists forced King Farouk into exile in mid-
1952 and a year later an assembly of army officers took over the government effectively 
replacing the short-lived Kingdom of Egypt (1922-1953) with the modern Republic of Egypt. 
 Leading this movement was Gamal Abdel Nasser, “an ambitious and visionary young 
colonel who dreamed of reasserting the dignity and freedom of the Arab nation, with Egypt at 
the heart of the renaissance.”219  As one eyewitness observed, 
The charismatic Nasser inspired Arabs everywhere to dream of the unification of all Arab 
countries under one government to bring back the ‘old lost glory’ of the Arabs.  Nasser’s 
vision, which was firmly linked to hatred of Western imperialism and Zionism, rallied the 
Arab world into a warlike frenzy.  Many people gathered in cafés to listen on the radio to 
his passionate speeches, heroic defiance of the West, and promises to restore Arab 
glory.220 
 
By 1956, following the geopolitical debacle that was the Suez Crisis, the Egyptians were at long 	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last in charge of their own affairs after successfully expelling British forces.  The result was a 
populace rallying behind the nationalistic ideals espoused by Nasser, ideals that would come to 
be known as Pan Arabism and serve as a unifying force in the Middle East (ex. an understanding 
of life and reality in the region that contributed to many of the wars involving Israel).  In 
Nasser’s own words: “If we stand united as one, no enemy can ever conquer us . . . For it is in 
our division that Israel has been able to remain victorious.”221  This is the context in which the 
modern Republic of Egypt must be understood – a nation united by ideas about who they are and 
a perceived divine purpose. 
Ever since the Egyptian army ended President Hosni Mubarak’s 20-year reign in 
February 2011, “the rule of law has been unstable across the country, and the judicial system’s 
independence [has been] poorly institutionalized.  Judicial procedures tend to be protracted, 
costly, and subject to political pressure.”222  By and large, this tumultuous power vacuum has 
enabled authoritarian and oppressive Islamic ideologies to establish a foothold within essentially 
every facet of society (the constitution does provide for freedom of belief and religious practice 
but Islam is the official state religion and the primary source of legislation is Sharia 
principles).223  Demonstrations of this reality can be seen in two of the primary political parties at 
work in post-Mubarek elections – the Al Nour Party and the Freedom and Justice Party.  
Although there is a key difference between the two that must be understood, the similarities 	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attest to the viability of constructivism. 
 The Salafi ideology banning its followers from involving themselves in politics 
notwithstanding, the Al Nour Party formed as an umbrella organization for the various Salafi 
movements and explicitly supported the candidacy of General Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi.224  Fearing 
that non-Islamists were attempting to replace the Mubarek government with a secularist state, 
there was widespread agreement in the Salifi community that the doctrine of necessity (darura) 
allowed them to participate in the political arena on the grounds of a perceived threat to Sharia 
and the Islamic identity of the country.225  Similarly, and in spite of what its namesake suggests, 
the Freedom and Justice Party is in fact the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.  As stated 
by the Brotherhood’s Deputy General Guide, their “overall mission as Muslim Brothers is to 
empower [Allah’s] Religion on Earth, to organize our life and the lives of people on the basis of 
Islam . . . and to the subjugation of people to [Allah] on Earth.”226  This is where the key 
distinction between the two factions arises. 
 Although Islam and Sharia are the driving force behind both parties’ ideology and policy 
platform, they differ in terms of their end state.  For the Salifi movement, the focus is largely 
internal – strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, calling people to “true Islam,” and resisting 
democratic and Western influence on the basis that it subordinates the will of Allah to the will of 
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man.227  Conversely, the political outlook for the Freedom and Justice Party is comprehensive: 
It is to explain the Quran, to raise the wealth of people, to unify Muslims, to combat 
ignorance, to free Islamic lands from foreigners and their allies and to promote peace 
across the world.  The struggle is quite pervasive and includes every aspect of daily life.  
In order to achieve these goals, the Muslim Brotherhood has not avoided making 
alliances in politics and being pragmatic.228 
 
In light of this, while both parties bear significance to the nation of Egypt due to the reality that 
they represent the views held by the majority of Egyptians, the Freedom and Justice Party wields 
a greater impact upon the region than the internally focused Al Nour Party.  Considering the 
Muslim Brotherhood has stated via its puppet-party the intent to restore “the leading role of 
Egypt in its regional and Arab, Islamic, African and global spheres,”229 the Freedom and Justice 
Party stands to spread political Islam thereby creating an Egypt that may stand as an impediment 
to Western interests in the region. 
Iran 
 Unlike the majority of its neighbors in the region, Iran is of Persian heritage rather than 
Arab.  Also unlike many of its neighbors, rather than being a former vassal or possession of the 
Ottoman Empire the land of modern-day Iran (known as Persia until 1935) instead represents 
territory held by a number of Persian dynasties that battled the Ottomans for centuries.  
Nonetheless, by the turn of the 20th Century the dynastic system that had withstood numerous 
conflicts would come under siege from a Western antithesis – constitutionalism.  Materializing 
as a weapon against royal autocracy, the Iranian constitutionalist movement was led by an 
awkwardly assembled coalition of interests and contradictory understandings of what a 	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constitutional government should achieve.  The three main components of this movement were: 
the ulama (“the learned of Islam, those who possess the quality of ʿilm, ‘learning,’ in its widest 
sense”230), the Shia religious establishment, disjointed in their support but seeing the movement 
as a means to guarantee their independence from the state and possibly increase their power; the 
traditional bazaar merchants, a group that detested the Shah’s practice of granting concessions to 
foreign governments and saw Iran’s acquiescence to Christian economic interests as and 
offensive to their religious sensibilities; and a small group of radical reformers, motivated by 
sentiments of liberalism, patriotism, and a belief that a constitutional government was critical to 
a strong and progressive Iran.231  Put another way, the combination of religion and Western 
constitutionalism yielded a hybrid with considerable mobilization capacity that could be 
characterized as “a weak state that existed with a strong society where the clerics, merchants, 
statesmen, and other social groups were serious challengers to the state’s authority.”232 
 The first Persian constitution materialized from 1906-1907.  Modeled after the Belgian 
Constitution of 1831 (with consultation of the Bulgarian, French, and Ottoman constitutions also 
taking place), the new legal foundation restricted the power of the king; expanded the power of 
the prime minister, parliament, and the newly established secular judiciary (thereby mitigating 
the religious jurists’ traditional authority); yet also established unprecedented institutional 
powers within the clerical establishment and simultaneously undermined the new civil liberties, 
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Parliament, and the judiciary.233  As the sociopolitical environment of the country continued to 
evolve, the country would experience a civil war and Mohammad Ali Shah would attain power, 
albeit briefly, to the point that his despotic renown would be characterized in the Ottoman press 
as a Muslim ruler who slaughtered and oppressed his people without peer – his closest rival 
being non-Muslim Czar Nicholas of Russia.234  By 1909, the revolutionary environment at hand 
forced him to abdicate but he would attempt (and fail) to regain his position by force, rallying 
Azerbaijani supporters to counter the nationalist movement, in 1911.235  In fact, from 1909-1914 
Persia saw the rapid succession of over 10 short-lived governments at the same time that foreign 
involvement, particularly from Britain and Russia, was on the rise (e.g. Russia issuing an 
ultimatum to Tehran to oust American Morgan Shuster who was employed by the government to 
reform public finances; protests and shifts in public opinion that effected England’s ability to 
craft an effective foreign policy for Iran in conjunction with Russia’s financial dependence on 
Britain; etc.).236 
 Further exacerbating the foreign involvement predicament was the outbreak of WWI and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 233. Janet Afary, “Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s First Constitution,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 25, no. 2 (2005): 341-42, 
accessed May 3, 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/186819. 
 
 234. Palmira Brummett, Image & Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-
1911 (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2000), 96, accessed May 3, 2016, Google 
Books. 
 
 235. David N. Yaghoubian, Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in 
Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014), 76-78, accessed May 3, 2016, Google 
Books. 
 
 236. N. Nasiri-Moghaddam, “Iran and its Eastern Regions (1848-1989),” in History of 
Civilizations of Central Asia Vol. VI, ed. Chahryar Adle (Paris: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005), 476, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books, and 
Mansour Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 197, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books. 
 	  
84 
the disregard for Persian neutrality by the Ottomans, Russians, and British who engaged in battle 
and/or occupied swaths of Persian territory.  Even as the withdrawal of foreign forces took place 
in the immediate post-war period and into the early 1920s, competing social forces continued to 
wreak havoc upon the country.  In 1921, army officer Reza Khan supported a coup that led to 
extensive political, economic, and social changes (he became prime minister in 1923; parliament 
voted him ruler in 1925, deposing Ahmad Shah; and crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926) – yet 
amidst the transition from the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) to the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), the 
Shia clergy tended to view their role as one of “protecting the people from the power of the 
state.”237 
 In 1935, Persia officially changed its name to Iran – a symbolic adjustment for a nation 
dealing with an internal nationalist movement and coming at a time when independent states and 
self-determination of peoples were the geopolitical commodities being exported around the 
globe.  When Germany resurfaced as a force to be reckoned with at the onset of WWII, Reza 
Shah Pahlavi’s reliance on German technology in support of his ambitious development plans 
troubled the Allies and on August 25, 1941 Iran once again found itself occupied by British and 
Russian (this time under the Soviet banner) forces.238  During this time, Reza Shah abdicated (or 
was deposed) in September 1941 and was replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza.  In January of 
1942, Iran, England, and the U.S.S.R. signed the Tripartite Treaty that guaranteed political 
independence and territorial sovereignty for Iran (Article 5 stated: “The forces of the Allied 
Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities 	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between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended”).239  Although 
this treaty stated that it was entered into “having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter,” 
the behind-the-scenes involvement of the British, Soviets, and Americans (through personnel 
from the Office of Strategic Services) indicated that the initial frosts of the Cold War had already 
begun to fall.240 
 Domestically, the end of the Second World War and initial ruminations of the Cold War 
ushered in a critical period in modern Iranian history.  In 1950, Ali Razmara became prime 
minister but was assassinated, leaving the seat open for the nationalist Mohammad Mossadeq in 
early 1951.  That same year, Mossadeq’s government voted to nationalize the oil industry 
dominated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and he subsequently demanded that he be made 
Minister of War, using the newly acquired power to dismiss officers loyal to the Shah and 
hedging his position by gaining support from the Tudeh Party (i.e. the Iranian Communist Party 
that the pro-Western Shah had banned).241  Amid the internal strife produced by Mossadeq’s 
monumental reforms, the Shah attempted to dismiss Mossadeq but instead found himself fleeing 
the country as a result of public protests in support of the prime minister.  Departing the country 
in 1953, the Shah, however, would only be gone for a few months. 
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 Also in 1953, the CIA and British intelligence backed a coup that utilized the alienated 
military officers to reinstate the Shah and try, convict, and sentence Mossadeq for treason.  For 
the Western powers, this coup removed a Communist sympathizer and replaced him with a pro-
West regime; preserved access to critical oil supplies while successfully countering the Soviet’s 
access; and established a critical strategic foothold during the perpetual tensions of the Cold 
War.  For the Shah, it brought him back to power for a quarter of a century.  For Iran, it placed a 
recipe for social unrest on a low-simmer for the extent of his reign.  Formulated from 1958-1963 
and promoted from 1963-1978, the Shah attempted to provide a legitimizing ideology for his 
regime and foreign involvement (in the face of an increasingly politically aware population) 
through the “White Revolution” and its message of modernization and its championing of 
revolutionary nationalism.242  Despite his best efforts to craft a narrative conducive to his 
administration, the reality that he surrounded himself with symbols of wealth, did little to curb 
his lavish lifestyle, and ultimately ignored the mounting discontent of his people fostered an 
environment where the fissures between the “haves” and the “have-nots” combined with 
frustrations of perceived Western influence on Tehran led to the 1979 Revolution.243 
 In January, the political situation deteriorated to the point that the Shah and his family 
were forced into exile; in February, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (the Islamic fundamentalist 
exiled by the Shah for opposing the regime) returned after 14 years in Iraq and France; and by 
April the secular state of Iran was officially replaced by the Islamic Republic of Iran following a 
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referendum.244  By November, the fundamentalist Islamic militancy would generate the Iran 
Hostage Crisis in which 52 American hostages were seized in the U.S. embassy while their 
captors demanded for the Shah’s extradition (he was receiving medical treatment in the United 
States at that time).  In short, the year 1979 is the standard by which the Islamic Republic is 
measured even to this day.  This momentum continued into 1980.  For one, as discussed 
previously, the Iran-Iraq War that began when Saddam invaded Iran evolved into what the 
Ayatollah believed was a “Holy War” and contextually is regarded by some as the single-greatest 
defining event for Iran’s politics, revolutionary ideology, and perspectives on security and 
society. 245  But on the home front, the Ayatollah established the Council of the Cultural 
Revolution that was charged with shaping the social fabric and worldview of the Iranian people 
and embarked upon a three-year purge of the universities that sought to cleanse ideological 
debate forums of “subversives” (i.e. authoritarian censorship).246 
 And such has been the foundation for Iranian society ever since.  The group responsible 
for the student protests that eventually gave rise to the 1979 Revolution have since formed a 
political party – Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Leader – that sources its ideology 
from the Shia belief in a successor to the Prophet and the historical narrative of Imam Mahdi or 
the “Twelfth Imam” (modern Shias believe that the Twelfth Imam did not die and will one day  
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reappear to resume his rightful role as spiritual and temporal ruler).247 As a direct byproduct of 
this ideology, 
The “Islamic” Constitution of Iran, introduced by Khomeini in 1979, is a mixture of 
Western and Islamic forms, not an “Islamic” constitution as such.  Far from being subject 
to Islamic law, Khomeini made it clear that the Islamic state, as successor to the Prophet 
Muhammad, had the power to override Islamic law, even in such fundamentals of the 
faith as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage.248 
 
It is this same belief in the succession of the Prophet and the Twelfth Imam that has enabled the 
authoritarian policy platform of the regime to last for more than 30 years (successors to the 
Prophet are considered infallible and Khomeini established a theory that postulated the most 
learned scholar should rule as the Imam’s deputy until Imam Mahdi returns from his currently 
hidden state)249 and why the nation’s nuclear endeavor is such a destabilizing force in the region 
(Khomeini allowing himself to be referred to as “Imam” exploited a religious source of power 
and the eschatological implications of the Twelfth Imam unifying the world under Islam).250   
Consequently, this bulwark of ideology that has buttressed the regime’s power base has 
also led to the façade of party politics within the country.  In addition to banning those who 
oppose the government, candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council, a powerful 12-member 
body that vets political candidates prior to elections and certifies their eligibility to run for  
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office.251  Thus, even elected officials claiming membership in a different political party become 
yet another extension of the theocratic regime.  This can be seen in current president Hassan 
Rouhani who, despite being a so-called “reformist” that proclaims the value of unity and 
meritocracy, originates from within the regime and has a history of quelling non-violent protests, 
suppressing free speech, and endorsing the employment of chemical weapons.252  Therefore, 
regardless of the illusion of representative government or republicanism, “as long as criticism is 
considered a danger to the system, Iran will never have a true multi-party democracy.”253 
Transnational Terrorism 
 Terrorism is an enigma.  While attempts to define the term exist in abundance, a 
standardized definition upon which the international community agrees upon is notably absent.  
To the contrary, upon examining the assorted definitions available too often “rather than learning 
what terrorism is, one instead finds . . . a somewhat potted historical – and, in respect of the 
modern accepted usage of the term, a uselessly anachronistic – description.”254  Further 
complicating matters is the innate difficulties in discussing and defining terrorism independent of  
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the connections between terrorist organizations and the nations that support them.255  However, 
upon further examination the most widely accepted contemporary understandings of the term 
contain a key conceptual component: terrorism “is fundamentally and inherently political.”256  In 
light of this, if one assumes that terrorism is a politically motivated act conducted by an 
individual (or group of individuals) then the analysis of terrorism can be framed similarly to the 
aforementioned sections (i.e. Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with 
governmental action to formulate public policy and the psychological observation that “human 
cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets of beliefs and assumptions about life 
and reality”).  Thus the intent of this case study is not to provide an ad nauseum survey of the 
development of terrorist organizations, but instead to discuss the development of modern Middle 
Eastern terrorism and a cross-section of the motivating forces behind it. 
 Brutal atrocities for political purposes are not a new occurrence in the Middle East.  To 
the contrary, the Assyrians are often considered “the earliest practitioners of psychological 
warfare” to the point that in ancient times the term “Assyrian” was synonymous with “cruelty to 
one’s neighbors.”257  Over a thousand years later the piracy and forcible acquisition of Western 
slaves by the Barbary Pirates led William Eaton to assert:  “There is but one language which can 
be held to these people and this is terror.”258  Even in the 20th and 21st Centuries, Palestinian 
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nationalist organizations (e.g. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, non-Islamist militias 
associated with the Palestinian Authority such as Fatah Tanzim, etc.)259 and the secular 
movements trained by Hezbollah (a fundamentally religious organization that receives support 
from Iran and Syria)260 employ terrorism to support their objectives.  However the events of 
September 11, 2001 radically adjusted the way in which terrorism is perceived in the modern era. 
 The post-9/11 world has led some to argue that “terrorism in the name of religion has 
become the predominant model for political violence in the modern world.”261  More 
specifically, the correlation is drawn between terrorism and the religion of Islam.  While this has 
regrettably produced a number of convoluted responses and sweeping generalizations (to be 
addressed in Part 4), the fact remains that there are many who view it as their duty as Muslims to 
wage jihad against those considered to oppose the will of Allah – which is often the West.  Such 
a position finds its modern ideological roots in the teachings of a Western-educated Egyptian by 
the name of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966).  Regarded as the “intellectual godfather” of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, there exists a level of ambiguity as to whether Qutb’s disenchantment was 
primarily seated in a detestation of the United States or authoritarian Islamic governments that 
failed to adhere to Muslim ideals.262  Nevertheless, the impact of his work remains.  Describing 
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the Arabic word for “striving” (i.e. jihad) as “any form of activity, either personal or community 
wide, of Muslims in attempting to strive for the cause of God and for the sake of Islam,” Qutb’s 
world-renowned commentary on Islamic scholasticism, Milestones, outlines the Muslim’s 
responsibility towards three categories of non-believers: “one, those with whom there was peace; 
two, the people with whom the Muslims were at war; and three, the Dhimmies [non-Muslims 
living in a Muslim country whose protection and rights were to be protected by the Muslim 
government].”263  Those in the first category were to go unharmed, provided they continually 
met the obligations of the peace treaties in existence; those in the second category, war was to be 
declared against the “polytheists,” “hypocrites,” and “the ‘People of the Book’ [i.e. Jews and 
Christians] who declare open enmity, until they agree to pay Jizyah [i.e. tax] or accept Islam;” 
and those in the third category were to be protected accordingly.264 
 Contextually, Qutb’s position developed in concert with a number of geopolitical and 
social circumstances transpiring during his lifetime.  For one, the French and British capitalized 
on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and created new governments and maps for the Middle 
East; for a proud man such as Qutb “the humiliation of his country at the hands of secular leaders 
and Western puppets was galling.”265  After his time in the United States, he struggled to 
understand a society with rampant promiscuity, materialism, and vulgarity that successfully 
blinded people to the “real zenith of civilization, which for Qutb began with Muhammad in the 
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seventh century and reached its apex in the Middle Ages, carried triumphantly by Muslim 
armies.”266  As these circumstances fused with his deeply held beliefs, he leveraged his 
intellectual prowess to become the most influential advocate for jihad in the modern era and the 
chief developer of doctrines legitimizing violent Islamic resistance to so-called Muslim regimes 
whose implementation of Islamic precepts is deemed imperfect (doctrines extended to the 
Western World in accordance with the second category of non-believers).267 
 It is these ideas espoused by Qutb and the geopolitical context in which they were written 
and marketed that are critical to the understanding of jihad as waged by al Qaeda.  Osama bin 
Laden established a clear and detailed framework for understanding the al Qaeda perspective on 
the struggle between Islam and the West in his “Letter to America.”  He wrote, “While seeking 
Allah's help, we form our reply based on two questions directed at the Americans: (Q1) Why are 
we fighting and opposing you?  (Q2) What are we calling you to, and what do we want from 
you?”268  To answer the first question, bin Laden meticulously outlined a number of “tragedies” 
America inflicted upon him and fellow Muslims – attacking them in Palestine and Somalia; 
supporting the Russians in opposing the Muslim uprisings in Chechnya; “stealing” oil at “paltry 
prices” via international influence and military threats; occupying Muslim countries and starving 
their populations; and supporting the Jews “in their idea that Jerusalem is their eternal capital.”  
Yet, by his own admittance this list was by no means considered exhaustive: 
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These tragedies and calamities are only a few examples of your oppression and 
aggression against us.  It is commanded by our religion and intellect that the oppressed 
have a right to return the aggression.  Do not await anything from us but Jihad, resistance 
and revenge.  Is it in any way rational to expect that after America has attacked us for 
more than half a century, that we will then leave her to live in security and peace?!! 
 
With the “why?” foundation established, the leader of al Qaeda transitioned to answering 
the second question (“what are we calling you to, and what do we want from you”).  First and 
foremost, he called for America to embrace Islam.  From there he demanded that the United 
States end the “oppression, lies, immorality and debauchery that has spread” throughout the 
country; take “an honest stance with [itself]…to discover that [it is] a nation without principles 
or manners;” terminate support for Israel, the Indians in Kashmir, the Russians against the 
Chechens, and the Manila Government against Muslims in the Philippines; withdrawal forces 
from Islamic countries; remove support for “corrupt leaders” of Muslim countries; and interact 
with al Qaeda on “the basis of mutual interests and benefits.”  At first glance it could be 
misconstrued that these are distinct and separate demands.  However, when understood at their 
fundamental essence and interpreted through the lens of Qutb’s framework for jihad, it becomes 
evident that bin Laden’s entire answer to the second question is a multifaceted call to Islam.  In 
other words, if America willingly embraces the Islamic faith then the remaining portions of the 
second answer will come about automatically (i.e. the newfound ideas would combine with 
governmental action to generate the demanded policy decisions). 
That said, while it is critical to understand the pivotal role played by jihad as a motivator 
for terrorism it is also paramount that one understands the term is interpreted and applied 
differently by various groups invoking it as the mandate for their cause.  For example, the U.S. 
backed warlords in Afghanistan during the 1980s sought to validate their looting and pillaging 
while the Taliban that toppled them endeavored towards a state that would enforce Sharia; “both 
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parties use the same language of legitimacy – Islam, jihad, and mujahideen – which adds to the 
confusion, but their similarities are skin-deep.”269  Similarly, as a field reporter observed with 
regards to ISIS: 
We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways.  First, we 
tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al-Qaeda to an organization 
that has decisively eclipsed it.  The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to 
Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor.  But jihadism has evolved since al-
Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s 
priorities and current leadership.270 
 
Considering that the Taliban and Islamic State organizations have since declared jihad against 
one another replete with rhetoric campaigns undermining the spiritual and religious credibility of 
leadership on both sides, it becomes increasingly apparent that the global jihad movement is in 
disarray.271  Thus, sound analysis of the issue of terrorism in the Middle East must not only sift 
through the religious and secular genres of terror, but, in the event it is deemed religiously 
motivated, must take into account which strain and interpretation of Islam and/or jihad is at work 
in a given situation.  Failing to manage this compendium of differing ideas during the analytical 
process will inevitably lead to superficiality and impreciseness – a recipe for disaster if the 
analysis and resulting recommendations are the driving force behind strategy and policy 
development.  
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Part 4 
Reconciling the West and the Middle East 
 
War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.  
Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against 
violence. . . . Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without 
the conception of States and Law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of 
the enemy to our will is the ultimate object.  In order to obtain this object fully, the 
enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of 
hostilities in theory. 
 
–Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
 
 Ideas matter.  According to a tradition stemming from the days of Aristotle, man is 
considered distinct from the animals, capable of sensation and appetite, due to their unique 
ability to wield rationality.272  When correlated with Aristotle and Aquinas’s observation that 
“man is naturally a social and political animal,” it can be argued that the social and political 
nature of man that also stands in stark contrast to the Animal Kingdom is an offshoot of the 
capability to reason.  If one accepts Clausewitz’s assertion that war “is an act of violence 
intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,”273 then it necessarily follows that conflict is 
a manifestation of political decision making which is in turn a byproduct of ideas and socially 
contrived national interests (i.e. “will”).  Thus, for the purpose of analyzing geopolitics and 
international relations, it can be concluded that there is a pragmatic answer to the question with 
which this thesis began: What is truth? 	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 Unfortunately, and at the risk of being anticlimactic, that answer is: Irrelevant.  This must 
not be misconstrued that the Master’s Candidate is assuming a relativistic outlook and somehow 
arguing that truth does not exist.  To the contrary, because of the plethora of belief systems in 
existence (e.g. atheism, monotheism, polytheism, etc.) that are mutually exclusive it is a logical 
and metaphysical certainty that one of them is accurate and therefore true (i.e. there is no 
god/God, there is a god/God, or there are many gods, etc.).  Nevertheless, despite the reality that 
these various worldview types cannot be simultaneously true, there are people who believe them 
to be true and said beliefs impact the way they behave.  The same can be said of nations on the 
basis that they are collectives of humans.  Merging Hegel’s philosophy with psychology and 
neuroscience, just as suppressing traumatic memories may block memory formation in the 
present274 and emotional memories are seemingly stored and retrieved more effectively than non-
emotional memories275 the so-called “core memories” (i.e. dialectic) of a nation or organization 
can be skewed, suppressed, modified, and/or emotionally charged, thereby effecting the way in 
which it behaves.  Consider Germany during the interwar years.  Although Versailles was not as 
harsh as it could have been, it was portrayed as such by Hitler in order “to create a tidal wave of 
anti-Versailles sentiment on which he could then ride into power”276 – yet once he attained 
power he struggled at times to implement his desired objectives, as seen in his lament: “It’s been 
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our misfortune to have the wrong religion.  Why didn’t we have the religion of the Japanese, 
who regard sacrifice for the Fatherland as the highest good?  The Mohammedan religion too 
would have been much more compatible to us than Christianity.  Why did it have to be 
Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness?”277 
 As demonstrated up to this point, when East met West at the turn of the 20th Century a 
convergence of ideas resulted and is attempting to achieve equilibrium even to this day.  “The 
Middle East is a Shatterbelt, rent by the deep divisions within and between its sovereign states 
and peoples, and further inflamed by Great Power competition.”278  As imperialism spread, the 
most persistent and powerful Western political idea that permeated the region was that of 
revolution – more specifically self-styled revolutions as opposed to Islamic traditions of 
challenging the social and political orders “by leaders who believed that it was their sacred duty 
to dethrone tyranny and install justice in its place.”279  Because these revolutions were self-
styled, they took the shape of the prevailing ideas and worldviews motivating them (no different 
than that of the American Revolution): in Iraq, the Ba’thist Party and Saddam’s successful 
establishment of a Sunni regime despite the Shia majority; in Egypt, Nasser’s Pan-Arabism or 
the more recent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood; and in Iran, the constitutionalists in the early 
1900s or the 1979 Revolution that remains at the center of Tehran’s decision making.  The 
prevailing ideas and worldviews also explain why many of the resulting regimes setup 
educational indoctrination and censorship to root out and destroy ideas contrary to their cause (a 	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position not unique to the Middle East, considering the Church’s handling of heresy during the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance280).  In light of this, as the West (particularly the United States 
as “leader of the free world”) engages the Middle East it is paramount that it understands both 
the ideas upon which its society rests and the ideas foundational to the various nations and 
organizations with which it interfaces. 
The Failure of Westphalia – Paradoxical Assumptions 
 Divorcing the religious and the secular is a fundamentally Westphalian assumption.  This 
does not mean, however, that the export of the post-Westphalian nation state system constitutes 
the universalization of this assumption.  What many fail to realize is that the Westphalian 
separation of Church and State was a separation of institutions rather than the interplay of their 
ideas.  Although the Westphalian treaties demarcated geographic lines and established secular 
governments, the resulting nations were crafted largely based on sub-sects of Christianity (e.g. 
Protestants, Catholics, etc.).  “Medieval international relations theory thus consisted of 
speculation by contemporary observers about Latin Christendom and the means by which its 
internal political relations were regulated.”281  In other words, the unique beliefs and ideas of 
these sub-sects would produce policies only existing within their borders while the overarching 
similarities would produce the same baseline policies – “Law was either peculiar to one 
community (jus civile) or common to many (jus gentium).”282  It was these same overarching 
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presuppositions common within Christendom that fused with classical foundations of Western 
Civilization to directly contribute to the development of the post-Westphalia community of 
nations and the associated concepts of sovereignty and rule of law. 
There was never . . . an ignorant, superstitious, and irrational age in the cultural 
development of Western civilization.  The Christian leaders responsible for the 
development of Latin Christian doctrine were the products of a meticulous classical 
education.  The Latin apologists, Tertullian, Minucius Felix (late 2nd century), and 
Lactantius (250-326), came to Christianity from a classical professional background. 
Minucius deliberately borrowed the Greek literary style of the dialogue, together with the 
Roman use of legal rules of evidence, to persuade pagans that Christianity was consistent 
with the classical search for wisdom and goodness.283 
 
In short, Christianity was arguably the single-greatest defining force in the development of 
Western Civilization from the Romans to Westphalia. 
 But the Westphalian understanding and application of separation of Church and State 
would slowly evolve.  “The Christian West embraces a worldview that differs fundamentally 
from that of the pre-Christian West and the post-Christian West, which enabled it to develop and 
sustain the rule of law unique to the Western legal tradition.”284  As the religious and civic arenas 
came to be understood as mutually exclusive, the foundation for rule of law transitioned from a 
moral lawgiver (i.e. revealed law) to the concept of legal positivism (i.e. that which is legal is 
moral).  Such a philosophical paradigm shift was subsequently reinforced by the emergence of 	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postmodernism and its fundamental assertion that truth is relative set Western Civilization on an 
irreversible course.  “A culture cannot lose its philosophic center without the most serious of 
consequences, not just to the philosophy on which it was based but to the whole superstructure of 
culture and even each person’s notion of who he or she is.  Everything changes.  When God dies, 
both the substance and the value of everything else die too.”285  For America, the leading 
Western superpower and leader of the free world, the postmodern crisis shakes the core of its 
“liberty heritage, attacking those historic Christian principles of individuality, self-government, 
property and conscience, and limited civil jurisdiction that were so prominent and influential 
during our founding era.”286  To put it more succinctly, by denying the existence of truth, moral 
law and the law of nature (e.g. Locke, Hobbes, etc.) cease to have any societal impact and the 
American political philosophy is rendered self-referentially incoherent. 
The Middle East’s Rejection of Westphalia – Political Islam  
 In the wake of Arab Spring and other transnational movements, some scholars have noted 
that, “like a pendulum swing, secular nationalism is increasingly being replaced as the dominant 
intellectual paradigm in the Middle East by the emergence of Islamist political thought.”287  Yet, 
this is to be expected based on history and the basic tenants of Shari’a.  As the imperial powers 
leveraged their will in the region, the dynamic political environment “gradually but decisively 
shifted from building liberal constitutional governance systems [e.g. Egypt, Iraq, Iran, etc.] to 
assertive nationalism whose main objective was getting rid of the colonialists and the ruling 	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systems that worked with them.”288  This was also a key factor behind the ascension of militarist 
regimes that came to dominate many Arab countries from the 1950s until the Arab uprisings of 
2011.289  Now that the colonialist powers have been expelled from the area, the prevailing 
worldview of Islam has gained considerable momentum through the illusion of “democracy” as 
promulgated by the Arab Spring.  Combine this with the firmly established authoritarian Islamic 
regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it was arguably inevitable that a time would come where 
Islam would dominate all other intellectual paradigms in Middle Eastern politics. 
 Nevertheless, while the political environment has facilitated the revitalization of Islam as 
a political ideology, Islam, by its very nature, is inherently political and therefore serves as both 
religion and constitution.  Islamic law (i.e. Shari’a) is “all-encompassing, addressing all aspects 
of life.  Islam does not distinguish between rituals and the every-day aspects of conduct; all are 
to be done according to the will of Allah.”290  The indisputably spiritual elements 
notwithstanding, “it would be a mistake to think of Shari’a as a ‘religious’ code in the Western 
sense because it seeks to regulate all manner of behavior in the secular sphere – economic, 
social, military, legal and political.”291  Simply put,  
In Islam, the entire political entity is ordained “by [Allah] himself, to promote his faith 
and to maintain and extend his law.”  This is the primary reason why many Muslims 
demand the enforcement of Shari’a in all countries in which they reside.  Because 
mosque and state are not separate, a devout Muslim must have the state recognize and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 288. Tarek Osman, “Why Border Lines Drawn with a Ruler in WW1 Still Rock the 
Middle East,” BBC News, December 14, 2013, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.bbc.com 
/news/world-middle-east-25299553. 
 
 289. Ibid. 
 
 290. Gelpe, The Israeli Legal System, 281. 
 
 291. William G. Boykin et al., Shariah: The Threat to America (Washington, D.C.: The 
Center for Security Policy, 2010), 6. 
 	  
103 
apply Shari’a, or he or she cannot fully practice Islam.292 
 
Although there will be fundamental differences between Sunni and Shia implementation within a 
given society, this understanding of Political Islam will serve as the conceptual baseline for 
understanding its impact in the Middle East. 
With regards to a nation employing Political Islam, Shari’a guides policy formulation.  
The preeminence of Shari’a within the realm of policy, as described by Sayyid Abdul ‘Ala 
Maududi (one of the key developers of Political Islam in the modern era), seeks “to replace the 
sovereignty of the people expressed through parliamentary legislation, with the ‘sovereignty of 
[Allah]’ as revealed, in its perfection and finality, through the Shari’a.”293  In practice, this 
sovereignty of Allah concept manifests itself differently depending on the form of government – 
as seen in Egypt, where the Salifi’s have broken away from their traditional abstention from 
governmental activity and now navigate the parliamentary system to push a policy agenda 
promoting strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, calling people to “true Islam,” and resisting 
democratic and Western influence on the basis that it subordinates the will of Allah to the will of 
man294 or in Iran, where the Shiite Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that the Islamic state succeeded 
the Prophet and therefore had the power to override areas of Islamic Law, thereby producing a 
more dynamic policy environment vis-à-vis the governments of their Sunni neighbors.  However, 
despite any differences in practice, generally speaking the essence of Political Islam’s 
relationship with policy is the supremacy of Allah’s will within society itself. 
 Considering that laws are essentially policies that governments choose to enforce 	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coercively,295 it is only logical that, given the abovementioned relationship between Shari’a and 
policy in Political Islam, law also finds its origin in Shari’a.  Islamic legal scholars have 
“developed five legal categories into which all human behavior can be divided: 1) prohibited, 2) 
discouraged, 3) neutral, 4) recommended, or 5) obligatory” (e.g. fasting and prayer are 
obligatory, pork and alcohol consumption are prohibited, smoking is discouraged but not 
prohibited, etc.).296  These five categories of human behavior, in conjunction with the five higher 
objectives of Shari’a law (i.e. life, the ability to practice Islam, property, children, and human 
rationality),297 guide the legislative process within a Political Islam legal system. 
 For instance, it can be argued that the most definitive evidence of Political Islam’s 
pervasive impact on law is the absence of true freedom of religion (to include the prohibition of 
converting from Islam).  Because Shari’a is all-encompassing, there can be no absolute 
separation between the state (i.e. government) and Islamic society (ummah) as such a distinction 
“would be a logical absurdity.”298  Consequently, those bearing religious views contrary to the 
government (to include Shia Islam in a Sunni society and vice-versa) often lack any form of legal 
standing in the community on the grounds that they are a subversive force that runs contrary to 
the well being of society as a whole (ex. Christians and other minority religious groups in Iran 
being charged with “anti-government propaganda,” “propaganda against the state,” “gathering  
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against national security,” and “insulting Islam”).299  Put another way, being unaffiliated with 
Islam religiously is analogous to high treason within the construct of a Political Islam state. 
Further exacerbating this issue is the reality that even in politically Islamic countries that 
supposedly maintain laws “respecting” some form of freedom of belief and/or freedom of 
religion (e.g. Iran, Egypt, etc.), when these laws are not enforced appropriately (e.g. 
discrimination is permitted, arbitrary arrests, etc.) it is no different than if the law were not in 
effect.  Many naïve geopolitical commentators envisioned a post-Arab Spring Middle East that 
embodied democratic values such as freedom of religion, but they have been severely 
disappointed by the increased repression exacted upon religious minorities.300  What these 
analysts have failed to understand is that public policy (to include law) is “anything that 
governments do or choose not to do.”301  In other words, it is not the actual verbiage of a law or 
the format of a government that leads to a free society but it is entirely contingent upon the 
worldviews involved in generating ideas that are subsequently combined with governmental 
action (or inaction in the case of non-enforcement) to become policy and law. 
Recommendations for Strategy and Policy Development 
 Once again, ideas matter – strategy and policy development must take into account this 
reality.  Ideas drive action, inaction, and routine behavior of geopolitical actors.  Ideas also drive 
the way in which analysts and strategists describe, explain, and interpret said action, inaction, 
and behavior, making it of the utmost importance to understand not only the ideas of the actors 	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but also the ideas possessed by the analysts and strategists about the ideas of the actors (ex. “the 
transitional nature of comparative political analysis is illustrated by the adamant refusal of many 
to adopt new perspectives and to move in newly charted directions, while others enthusiastically 
and uncritically embrace new approaches and methods at first sight”302).  Ideas also explain the 
absence of a legal code on an international scale (and the inability thus far to compile one)303 and 
the “permeability, the limited nature, of the boundaries between states and societies.”304 
 Thus, ideas also hold the key to understanding the Middle East.  Although a 
comprehensive examination of the entire region would be valuable, it would also constitute a 
length and rigor far surpassing the scope of this thesis.  Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Part 3 
the geopolitical “case studies” present the preeminence of ideas in the shaping of a country’s 
identity (i.e. dialectic) and these same Middle Eastern identities stand in stark contrast with the 
evolution of the American identity from the Colonial Era to the present (Part 2).  Therefore, the 
United States as the leading Western superpower must not only understand its own identity and 	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associated implications but must also consider the same of the nation(s) it finds itself interacting 
with on the global stage.  Consequently, the following are three recommended pitfalls to avoid 
during the policy and strategy development process. 
Beware a Stubborn Hubris 
 While it is relatively simple to portray the Middle East as barbaric and inferior, such an 
approach does little to assist in understanding this dynamic region.  As noted by Edward Said, 
“because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the 
simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and 
terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking 
about the Near East are depressingly small.”305  Similarly, even Said’s intellectual rival Bernard 
Lewis noted that the rise of the Islamic civilization possessed not only periods where it regarded 
the outside world “as an outer darkness of barbarism and unbelief from which there was nothing 
to learn” but also times in which it was a leading contributor to the arts and sciences, thereby 
further inflaming the enigmatic nature of understanding the Middle East today.306 
 In the West, “for some people history is irrelevant; they believe they have passed the end 
of history and moved into a new, timeless world of speed and progress.  They believe they can 
overwhelm the deep structures of history by their sheer wealth, power, and technology.  Too 
often, they feel they do not need to honor history or can afford to be ignorant of it.”307  Such a 
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postmodern position is both reckless, as it chooses to forfeit invaluable opportunities to learn 
from the past, and intellectually arrogant.  At its core lies the assumption that man has reached 
the apex of its evolutionary progression in the development of Western liberal humanism.308  
Because this assumption is understood evolutionarily, the progressive reinterpretation and 
redefinition of “truth” is subsequently applied retroactively and key events and actors are 
understood in present terminology as opposed to what motivated them at the time and why (or 
why not) they were successful.  This inevitably leads to inconsistencies and unintended 
consequences. 
 “Some Americans believe that we should not learn from history but just copy it.  If only 
we could find another Truman administration . . . it would establish a new set of institutions for a 
new era.”309  However this completely misconstrues the peculiar institutions (e.g. separation of 
powers, Bill of Rights, Constitution, etc.) produced by the prevailing ideas and worldviews in 
early America (Part 2).  The notion of American exceptionalism was “a moral and religious 
belief” that the United States had “a special mission in history.”310  Yet when the focus becomes 
the institutions instead of the ideas and convictions that produced them, the result is a haphazard 
and paradoxical foreign policy that seeks to maintain “a ‘separate peace’ with other 
industrialized democracies, while engaging in recurring conflicts against authoritarian 
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regimes.”311 
 But “authoritarian” is inherently subjective.  Is it the institution of consolidated power 
that leads to oppression and corruption (i.e. is a benevolent monarchy possible?) or is democratic 
self-determination an unfailing approach to generating sound and impartial governments?  The 
answer is: No.  It is the ideas that fuse with governmental action to create public policy that 
produce just or unjust governments – not a given government’s institutional form.  An 
appropriate appreciation and respect for history, rather than an “End of History” approach, 
affirms this position.  World War II emerged as a result of the Wilsonian approach to geopolitics 
following the First World War; “from the conflict between territorial arrangements based on the 
principle of ‘self-determination’ and the realities of ethnically mixed patterns of settlement”312 
(e.g. the democratic, post-Versailles Germany that elected Adolph Hitler, the festering 
irredentism in Germany and areas formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, etc.).  “Only 
through self-government, [Wilson] assessed, could peoples express their will toward 
international harmony.”313  Yet this model has continually failed, particularly in the Middle East 
(Part 3), and will continue to fail as long as democracy is blindly applied to resolve the world’s 
problems and the lessons of the past are indignantly cast aside. 
Beware Nation Building 
 After the Cold War, America proclaimed its intention to construct a “new world order” 
by applying its domestic values to the rest of the world.  Contextually, this proclamation was 
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taking place for the third time in America’s history (Wilson after WWI then FDR and Truman 
after WWII), hence George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s rhetorical use of classically Wilsonian 
terms.314  While endorsing the concepts of democratic self-governance and self-determination 
makes for lofty and idealistic rhetoric, it is fundamentally flawed.  Aristotle classified democracy 
as a deviant constitution because it inevitably regresses to majority rule (which in his day would 
have empowered the poor to use their newfound influence to right any perceived injustice in the 
social order).315  Similarly, based on “such temporary aberrations as those of the French 
Revolution,” John Stuart Mill observed that phrases such as “self-government” and “the power 
of the people over themselves” do not contain the true intent of all who wield them – hence his 
comments that “in political speculations ‘the tyranny of the majority’ is now generally included 
among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.”316 
For America, it was not democracy that initiated its unrivaled ascendency to greatness but 
rather republicanism and the Judeo-Christian beliefs “that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness” (i.e. the foundation for a self-governing “moral and religious people”).  
But when America began its quest to export itself abroad, it erroneously exported and endorsed 
Western institutions rather than attempt to reshape the culture in its image.  As it initially 
supported the Western imperial mandates following WWI, it set into motion a period that would 
disenfranchise much of the Middle East with the West and open a fissure that Hitler would 
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eventually exploit.  As time went on, imperial authority was spread thin and collapsed when it 
was viewed as conflicting with Western liberal principles (e.g. self-governance, self-
determination, etc.) and was ultimately supplanted by political and military resistance 
movements that led to the creation of sovereign states as a result of marketing a secular 
Westphalian model.317  In short, encouraging “majority rule” systems of government in a region 
of the world notorious for Islamism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Western sentiments as a result of 
imperialism, and reinforcing said governments with the concept of self-determination, would 
eventually lead to a region of independent sovereignties that includes some of America’s 
deadliest opponents.318 
The repeated failings of this paradigm notwithstanding, the “new world order” put stock 
in the colloquialism: “third time is a charm.”  With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the advent of 
global democratization was perceived to be at hand.  As the formerly bipolar world looked to the 
one remaining pole for guidance, the United States was expected to lead the world into a new 
era.  Experts who had once worked for freedom in the Soviet Bloc during the Reagan 
administration adapted their methodologies to fit the Middle East – a region drastically different, 
for where multiparty systems had existed in Eastern Europe prior to the Soviets the Islamic 
world had no democratic model to return to because, with few exceptions, “liberal democracy 
had never taken root after the collapse of the Sultanate.”319  This plight continues even in the 
post-9/11 environment.  Despite the toppling of the Taliban and the Iraqi Ba’ath, the elimination 	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of despotic institutions has not rolled back jihadist or ultra-authoritarian ideologies; “since the 
U.S. bureaucrats never factored in a war of ideas, or an ideological renaissance, they weren’t 
able to sweep societies swiftly into the realm of democratic pluralism.”320  In Iraq, democracy 
changed the state from Sunni-led to Shia-led, created internal instability and disenfranchisement, 
and ultimately paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State.  In Afghanistan, the democratic 
national government still struggles to find validation from the general population and Western 
concepts are irreconcilable with much of the tribal system. 
A tribe is a “natural democracy.”  In Afghan shuras and jirgas (tribal councils), every 
man’s voice has a chance to be heard.  The fact that women and minority groups have no 
say in the process does not make it less effective nor less of a democracy to them.  
Asking them to change the way they have always conducted their business through their 
jirgas and shuras just does not make sense.321 
 
Even the democratic Egyptian government ushered in after Mubarek’s overthrow (as opposed to 
American intervention) and the associated Arab Spring, a so-called democratization movement 
that reflected not the culmination of Western values but instead the prevailing worldviews of 
portions of the Middle East, yielded a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
contrary to Western interests in the region.  Simply put, democracy and sovereign states (in the 
Westphalian sense) are not solutions in and of themselves but rather institutions to be wielded for 
good or evil by the majority who controls them. 
Beware Superficial Analysis 
 In the end, the two aforementioned pitfalls stem from the third and final: superficial 
analysis.  For the hubris associated with the evolutionary belief in Western liberalism as the apex 
of civilization and its associated principle of building nations in its own image is the result of a 
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misunderstanding and misapplication of Western principles. 
 The argument now that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the 
world represents the triumph of Western civilization trivializes Western culture.  The 
essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac.  The fact that 
non-Westerners may bite into the latter has no implications for their accepting the former. 
 It also has no implications for their attitudes toward the West.  Somewhere in the 
Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, 
listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an 
American airliner.322 
 
This misunderstanding and misapplication is exponentially worsened by the progressive 
interpretation of history and the postmodern tenet that truth is relative and therefore no idea is 
any more valid than the next.  The geopolitical implications with this mindset have been 
discussed exhaustively via the unintended consequences of intervening in the Middle East in Part 
3 and up to this point in the current chapter.  However, there is one remaining discussion that 
must be had regarding the West’s interaction with the Middle East. 
 September 11, 2001 thrust the United States back into the Middle East and brought to the 
forefront a religion many still do not understand.  Regrettably the superficial analytical efforts 
attempting to address this issue typically digress to one extreme or another.  On one end of the 
spectrum is an irrational Islamophobia that argues all Muslims are terrorists.  There are a number 
of mainstream Islamic theologians who assert that the radical leaders who encourage a jihad 
against the infidels by means of terrorist acts “employ a faulty reading of the Quran.”323  
Pragmatically speaking, considering that there are more than one billion Muslims in the world 
today one would expect that the number of terrorist attacks would be far greater than it is if the 
call to violence was a universally accepted tenet of Islam (i.e. accepted as the Sixth Pillar).  	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Conversely, on the other end of the spectrum is the argument that the religion of Islam has 
nothing to do with modern terrorism.  It is this latter perspective that has formed the basis of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy and strategy. 
 The present-day secularized, postmodern identity of America is one built upon 
multiculturalism and therefore cannot bring itself to condemn any facet of Islamic society.  
While American leaders make it abundantly clear that the U.S. is not at war with Islam, it does 
not change the reality that those who use violence and fear in an attempt to establish a Caliphate 
that would be a “severe and repressive fourteenth-century literalist theocracy” do so because they 
believe it to be their duty as Muslims.324 
There is . . . a much more serious problem in the use in Western public policy of 
intellectual “guided missiles” that present a superficially nobler vision to woo Muslim 
activists away from opposition through the apparently benign strategy of defining Islam 
appropriately.  They try to wrench Islamic terrorists from violence by insisting that Islam 
is a religion of peace, and that a “true Muslim” must be a tolerant individual (“so come 
off it and be peaceful”).  The rejection of a confrontational view of Islam is appropriate 
and extremely important at this time, but we must also ask whether it is at all necessary or 
useful, or even possible, to try to define in largely political terms what a “true Muslim” 
must be like.325 
 
Such an approach can even lead to efforts so bent on divorcing the religious implications from 
the terrorist actor or organization that they begin to humanize the gruesome acts of terror they 
carry out – case in point, George Friedman’s response to bin Laden’s Letter to America: “What 
al Qaeda is fighting for is a traditional understanding of the family.  This is not a minor part of 
their program: it is at its heart.”326 
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 As a result of this convoluted rationale for confronting the perpetrators of 9/11, America 
embarked upon a “Global War on Terror” that has had ambiguous results.  “Most Muslims are 
not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists 
are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such.”327  Terrorism is not an enemy but rather a 
tactic used by the enemy – countering the tactic of the religious fanatic “requires a credible 
alternative to the absolutes with which he conjures.”328  Winning hearts and minds has become 
the slogan of the War on Terror and counter-insurgency efforts in the 21st Century.  Although 
hearts are fickle and can be temporarily purchased through petty temporal offerings, minds 
present a far more formidable challenge.  A war of ideas with the overarching objective of 
winning hearts and minds can only be achieved with superior ideas that are systematically 
coherent and sound in every possible regard (e.g. philosophically, logically, etc.).  For in a war of 
ideas, the mind must be regarded as a “domain” for warfare no different than land, sea, air, 
space, and cyber – a battlefield upon which victory is achieved by leveraging superior weaponry 
with sound and decisive tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Failure to do so will inevitably 
yield results marred by volatility, inconsistency, and unsustainability. 
Conclusion 
 Great similarity exists between today’s Middle East and 17th Century Europe leading up 
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to Westphalia – a Tunisian fruit vendor igniting himself on fire is regarded as a trigger for the 
Arab Spring just as Bohemian Protestant uprisings against the Catholic Habsburgs is considered 
a flashpoint for the Thirty Years War; the Middle East is fractured by a religious struggle 
involving competing traditions of Islam just as Christendom in Europe; and both regions can be 
characterized as one of civil wars and proxy wars blurred to the point of being indistinguishable 
from one another.329  However, the way forward from these distinct moments in history are 
extremely different.  The end of the Thirty Years War yielded a post-war system through the 
Westphalian treaties that found its philosophical origin and moral lifeblood in Christendom and 
the classics of the Western World.  It was a Western solution to geopolitical problems that was 
sustainable because it was applied to a Western populace.  Yet its export to the Middle East has 
been largely unsuccessful because, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, it was applied to a 
culture with a different philosophical and moral foundation and was therefore found to be foreign 
and largely incompatible with the region.  Arguably, it is the unintended consequences of the 
Westphalian system in the Middle East that have exacerbated transnational fault lines in the 
present day and introduced additional competing forces that must be understood when analyzing 
the region.  “Nationalist sentiments among Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, Malaysians, 
Indonesians, and others [have] fragmented the historic ‘land of Islam’ (dar el-Islam) into 
communities with clearly different priorities.”330  Conversely “any fundamentalist pan-Islamic 
movement, even a Shiite-inspired one, must embrace the fact that the Prophet, and later his 
Caliphs, sought to build empires with temporary but expanding borders, not nations with fixed 	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borders and identities.”331  Simply put, the Western influence as a result of intervention and the 
transnational elements of the Islamic world will perpetually result in geopolitical friction and are 
unlikely to ever find equilibrium. 
 Ending this thesis where it began, ideas and perceived truths correlate with the way in 
which people behave (and the way in which people conceptually explain the way in which 
people behave, i.e. liberalism, realism, etc.).  Although the Western world may continue to strive 
towards the “End of History” and democratizing the globe, it does not alter the fundamentally 
religious origin of the peculiar American system of governance.  Returning once more to the 
words of John Adams, 
While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners which are now 
producing desolation in so many parts of the world; while she continues sincere, and 
incapable of insidious and impious policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in 
the local destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of America once 
become capable of that deep simulation towards one another, and towards foreign 
nations, which assumes the language of justice and moderation while it is practising 
iniquity and extravagance, and displays in the most captivating manner the charming 
pictures of candor, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and insolence, this 
country will be the most miserable habitation in the world; because we have no 
government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by 
morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest 
cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only 
for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other. 
 
Although the postmodern viewpoint can divorce the religious and the secular and continue to 
perpetuate the Westphalian model, it does not mean that these ideas, beliefs, and convictions are 
universal.  It must be understood that the Middle East (and all other regions of the world for that 
matter) have distinct philosophical, religious, and cultural components that make them unique.  
Objectively speaking, the words of John Adams are not all that different from Sayyid Qutb: 
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Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in a society, rather, in a nation; 
for man does not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which is not seen 
materialized in a living society.  From this point of view, we can say that the Muslim 
community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does not 
denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers 
lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time.  It is the name of a group of people 
whose manners, ideas, and concepts, rules and regulations, values and criteria, are all 
derived from the Islamic source.  The Muslim community with these characteristics 
vanished at the moment the laws of God became suspended on earth.332 
 
Both individuals were writing of a prevailing worldview and how that same worldview served as 
the philosophical and moral foundation for everything within a society.  The implications of this 
are of the utmost importance, for as America attempts to market its ideals abroad without 
acknowledging the source of its ideals, it blindly endeavors to replace “core memories” of 
societies for the purpose of behavior modification.  The resulting “clash of civilizations” means 
that until such a time where people and their ideas are acknowledged as the fundamental element 
of international relations (i.e. constructivism), as opposed to preconceived notions of Man’s 
perfectibility (i.e. liberalism) or obsession with power (i.e. realism), the West’s interaction with 
the Middle East will continue to be haphazard, unproductive, and marred with unintended 
consequences that could have been avoided.  For until postmodern America understands that 
something cannot be objectively wrong unless there is an objective standard for morality (i.e. 
transcendent, immutable truth), an application of Westphalian sovereignty and self-determination 
will only empower the prevailing worldview of the people involved.  Consequently, the 
convergence of Westphalian (i.e. Western & secular) politics with the Middle East (i.e. non-
Western & non-secular) implies that, “to a significant extent, American power will depend on 
how it confronts fanatical enemies who believe more firmly than it does.”333   
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